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Judicial Immunity: In Search of an Appropriate 
Limiting Formula
BRUCE FELDTHUSEN*
D uring the last h a lf o f  the twentieth century the common law courts 
have consistently expanded the potential tort liability base o f pro­
fessional and occupational groups. In general, arguments about 
the adverse consequences o f broader liability rules have been rejected 
in fa vo u r  o f  the p la in tiffs claims fo r  relief In sharp contract 
is the English Court o f Appeal’s confirmation, and perhaps extension, 
o f the longstanding and restrictive principles o f ju d icia l immunity.
This article identifies the common law and statutory rules o f  
ju d icia l tort immunity, and discusses them in relation to their 
theoretical foundations. Are judges who sit in a court o f law suf­
ficiently distinguishable from  other occupational groups to justify  
this special protection, or are judges simply more sensitive to the 
adverse consequences o f tort liability within their own sphere? 
The article concludes that there is a valid  case fo r  a certain degree 
o f immunity, but not the virtually total immunity suggested in the 
fe w  modem cases on point.
Au cours de la deuxième moitié' du vingtième siècle, les tribunaux 
de com m on law n ’ont cessé d ’étendre les limites de la responsa­
bilité civile des groupes professionnels. En règle générale, les 
arguments fondés sur les conséquences néfastes d ’un élargissement 
de la responsabilité ont été rejetés en fa v e u r  du dédommagement 
de la victime. C ’est toutefois clairement à rebours de cette tendance 
que s ’inscrit une décision récente de la Cour d ’appel de l ’Angleterre 
qui confirme et peut-être même élargit la traditionnelle immunité 
des juges.
Le présent article examine les principes de com m on law 
et les dispositions législatives régissant l ’immunité des juges et 
évalue leur fondem ent théorique. La fonction des juges est-elle si 
différente des autres professions pour ju stifier cette protection 
particulière ou bien se peut-il simplement que les juges soient plus 
sensibles aux répercussions d ’une extension de la responsabilité 
dans leur domaine d ’activité? L ’auteur conclut que les juges  
devraient bénéficier d ’une certaine immunité, mais non de l ’immunité 
virtuellement complète que la jurisprudence récente semble consacrer.
♦B.A. (Hon.). 1972 (Queen's). LL.B., 1976 (U.W.O.), L.L.M., 1977 (Michigan). Assistant Professor 
o f Law, University o f Western Ontario, London.
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INTRODUCTION
T he principles which govern the liability o f public au thorities1 for 
torts com m itted in the exercise o r pu rpo rted  exercise o f their statutory 
m andates are beginning to em erge in the latter ha lf o f the twentieth 
century, as the highest courts in C anada2 and G reat Britain3 attem pt to 
develop m eaningful limiting formulas. T h e  relevant principles are as yet 
far from  clear, varying with the nebulous classification o f the function in 
question,4 and depend ing  upon vaguely defined term s such as 
“jurisd iction”, “p ro p e r”, “good fa ith”, “bona fide”, and “malice”. It is not 
surprising that this should be a subject o f  relatively recent interest, given 
the proliferation o f public authorities and their increasingly wide 
powers. W hat is surprising is that the principles which govern the tort 
liability o f judges5 for the consequences o f their judicial acts6 have 
received so little recent attention, aud rem ain as vague and difficult as 
those which govern o ther public authorities.
Sirros v. Moore et a l . ,7 a decision o f  the English C ourt o f  Appeal, is 
one o f  the few m odern decisions on point,8 and certainly the only one to 
exam ine the issue o f judicial liability in any depth. T he  great majority o f 
the cases considered by the court in Sirros were decided in the 
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth  centuries. T his is perhaps a 
credit to the honesty and com petence o f  the judiciary, and perhaps a 
credit to the rules o f judicial im munity which were designed to limit the 
num ber o f tort actions which m ight be brought against judges.
‘A public authority may be defined as an office, created by statute, which is empowered and/or directed 
to perform public functions.
lSee, for example. Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [ 1959] S.C.R. 121; Welbndge Holdings Ltd. v. Winnipeg, [1971]
S C R 957.
3See, for example, Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] A.C. 1004 (H.L.); Anns and Others v. London 
Borough of Merton, [1977] 2 All E.R 492 (FI L ).
‘Judicial support exists for differentiating liability depending upon whether the function is legislative, 
quasi-judicial, administrative, or operational. Supra, footnotes 2 and 3.
4For the pui poses o f this article, the term “judge” will be used to include any judicial officer who 
presides over a court o f law, superior or inferior, of, or not of, record. See infra, at 93-94. This 
definition includes magistrates and justices o f the peace because it will be argued that the same 
immunity ought to apply to these officers as to judges of superior courts o r courts o f record. They may 
be distinguished from other quasi-judicial officers by virtue o f their independent status: they are not 
c ivil servants in an einplovment relationship w ith the government. I w ish to emphasize that this is a 
functional definition only, and that no opinion is offered whether the same immunity principles ought 
to be extended to other quasi-judicial officers; that issue is beyond the scope o f this article. On that 
point see M. Brazier, "Judicial Immunity and the Independence o f the judiciary", [1976] Pub. Law 397.
T h is  article is concerned only with immunity for judicial acts and not with immunity for words spoken 
in performance of the judicial func tion. For a discussion o f the different basis and scope o f these two 
immunitv rules sec I). Thompson, "Judicial Immunity and the Protection o f Justices", (1958) 21 Modem
Law Review 517.
'[1975] 1 Q.B 118 (C.A.).
"See also Foran v. Tatangellu (1977), 14 O.R. (2d) 91 (Ont. H.C.).
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Not only are the cases on point somewhat outdated , but they are 
also inconclusive. T h e  judges in Sirros v. Moore could not agree upon the 
principles to be extracted from  the cases, and academic writers have put 
forw ard still o ther views.9 Even agreem ent upQn the statem ent o f a rule 
does not take one very far because the rules em ploy term s such as 
“jurisd iction” and “malice”, upon the definition o f which there  is rarely 
agreem ent o r certainty.
W hat do em erge from  the o lder authorities are suggestions that 
judicial liability (perhaps m ore accurately phrased as judicial im munity, 
since most judicial acts are im munized from  tort liability) may depend 
upon four d ifferen t categories o f variables. First, the scope o f immunity 
m ight depend  upon the status o f the court — superior o r in ferio r,10 of, 
o r not of, reco rd .11 Second, im munity might depend  upon the type o f 
e rro r which the judge had com m itted, particularly as regards an action 
in trespass. T he m ajor issue was w hether the e rro r went to the judge’s 
jurisdiction; to a lesser extent, distinctions were draw n between erro rs o f 
law- and fact. T h ird , relevant both to an action in trespass and to the less 
well-recognized action on the case, were considerations o f the standard 
o f  care observed by the ju d g e  — intentional, reckless, o r negligent error. 
Finally, closely related to the third category, but conceptually distinct, 
were considerations o f the judge’s purpose o r motive in perform ing the 
im pugned act, attracting liability for malice o r o ther im proper purpose. 
It is apparen t that when the variables within each category are com bined 
w ith one ano ther in a variety o f  ways, as they have been ,12 the question 
o f judicial im munity becomes potentially very complex.
T his article does not attem pt, except incidentally, to determ ine what 
the law o f  judicial immunity expressed in the o lder authorities actually 
was. Instead, as in the majority judgm ents in Sirros v. Moore, the focus is 
on what the scope o f judicial immunity ought to be. T he  article begins 
with a general exploration o f the argum ents which support a special rule 
o f judicial im munity. Next, the com m on law and statutory provisions on 
point are briefly sum m arized in o rd e r to provide a model for discussion. 
T hen  the various factors within each o f the four categories identified 
above are exam ined to test their responsiveness to the rationales which 
support judicial immunity. Finally, there is a brief discussion o f potential 
alternative com pensation schemes which m ight co-exist with a fairly 
extensive rule o f  judicial immunity.
•Thompson, supra, footnote 6; Brazier, supra, footnote 5; Rubinstein. “Liability in Tort o f judicial 
Officers”, (1964) 15 U of Toronto L.J. 317; Sheridan "The Protection o f Justices", (1951) 14 Modern L. 
Rev. 267; Johnson, “Comments”, (1971) 4 Ottawa L. Rev. 627. The older common law in the United 
States is similar, and not much clearer. See Jennings, “Tort Liability of Administrative Officers", (1937) 
21 Mtnn. L. Rev. 263; Comment, "Liability o f  Judic ial Officers U nder Section 1983”, (1969) 79 Yale L.J.
322, at 326-327. In the latter article the author suggests that in 1871 thirteen states had an absolute 
immunity rule unless the act was totally without jurisdiction, six imposed liability for malicious acts, and 
in nine others the ruling on point was unclear.
'Vnfra, at 92-93.
"Infra, at 93-94.
12See, for example, the judgment o f Buckley L.J. in Sirraj v. Moore, supra, footnote 7.
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THE ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
T h ere  is probably no m ore useful sum m ary o f the argum ents in 
support o f judicial immunity than that put forth  a century ago by Mr. 
Justice Field o f  the Suprem e C ourt o f the United States.13
For it is a general principle o f  the highest importance to the proper 
administration o f justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority 
vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without 
apprehension of personal consequence to himself. Liability to answer to 
everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action o f  the judge, would 
be inconsistent with the possession o f  this freedom, and would destroy that 
independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.
As observed by a distinguished English judge, it would establish the weakness 
o f  judicial authority in a degrading responsibility. Taaffe v. Downes, 3 Moore,
P C. 41. n.
The principle, therefore, which exem pts judges o f  courts o f  superior or 
general authority from liability in a civil action for acts done by them in the 
exercise o f  their judicial functions, obtains in all countries where there is any 
well-ordered system o f  jurisprudence. It has been the settled doctrine o f  the 
English courts for many centuries, and has never been denied, that we are 
aware of, in the courts o f  this country.
It has, as Chancellor Kent observes, “a deep root in the common law.”
Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 291.
Nor can this exemption o f  the judges from civil liability be affected by 
the motives with which their judicial acts are performed. T he purity o f  their 
motives cannot in this way be the subject o f  judicial inquiry. This was 
adjudged in the case o f  Floyd and Barker, reported by Coke, in 1608 (12 Coke,
25) where it was laid down that the judges o f  the realm could not be drawn in 
question for any supposed corruption impeaching the verity o f  their records, 
except before the King himself, and it was observed that if they were required 
to answer otherwise, it would “tend to the scandal and subversion o f  all 
justice, and those who are the most sincere, would not be free from continual 
calumniations."
The truth o f this latter observation is manifest to all persons having much 
experience with judicial proceedings in the superior courts. Controversies 
involving not merely great pecuniary interests, but the liberty and character 
o f  the parties and, consequently, exciting the deepest feelings, are being 
constantly determined in those courts, in which there is a great conflict in the 
evidence and great doubt as to the law which should govern their decision. It 
is this class o f  cases which imposes upon the judge the severest labor, and 
often create irf his mind a painful sense o f  responsibility. Yet it is precisely in 
this class o f  cases that the losing party feels most keenly the decision against 
him, and most readily accepts anything but the soundness o f  the decision in 
explanation o f the action o f  the judge. Just in proportion to the strength o f  
his convictions o f  the correctness o f  his own view o f  the case is he apt to 
complain o f  the judgment against him, and from complaints o f  the judgm ent 
to pass to the ascription o f  improper motives to the judge. When the 
controversy involves questions affecting large amounts o f  property or relates 
to a matter o f  general public concern, or touches the interests o f  numerous 
parties, the disappointment occasioned by an adverse decision, often finds 
vent in imputations o f  this character, and from the imperfection o f  human
"Bradley v. Fisher (1892), 80 U.S. at 649-50; 13 Wall, at 346.
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nature this is hardly a subject o f  wonder. I f civil actions could be maintained 
in such cases against the judge, because the losing party should see fit to 
allege in his complaint that the acts o f  the judge were done with partiality, or 
maliciously or corruptly, the protection essential to judicial independence  
would be entirely swept away. Few persons sufficiently irritated to institute an 
action against a judge for his judicial acts would hesitate to ascribe any 
character to the acts which would be essential to the maintenance o f  the 
action.
If upon such allegations a judge could be compelled to answer in a civil 
action for his judicial acts, not only would his office be degraded and his 
usefulness destroyed, but he would be subjected for his protection to the 
necessity o f  preserving a complete record o f  all the evidence produced before 
him in every litigated case, and o f  the authorities cited and arguments 
presented, in order that he might be able to show to the judge before whom 
he might be summoned by the losing party — and that judge perhaps one o f  
an inferior jurisdiction — that he had decided as he did with judicial 
integrity; and the second judge would be subjected to a similar burden, as he 
in his turn might also be held amenable by the losing party.
O ne au tho r has identified nine d ifferen t rationales supporting 
judicial im m unity,14 but the most im portant reduce to th ree d ifferent, 
but closely related, points. First, and probably forem ost, judicial 
im m unity is necessary to protect the free and independent exercise o f 
jud g m en t in the public interest. Second, judicial im munity is necessary to 
preserve the dignity and respect o f  the judicial system as a whole. T h ird , 
without a rule o f judicial im munity it may become increasingly difficult 
to attract men o f the highest character and ability to judicial positions.
Like most public authorities, a ju d g e  perform s his judicial functions 
for the benefit o f  the public at large; but unlike many public authorities, 
a ju d g e  adjudicates m atters arising between private individuals on a 
regular basis. Theoretically, the private individual is entitled to nothing 
m ore than an adjudication according to law which is responsive to the 
public good, and the judge m ust resolve conflicts between the private 
interest and the public interest, by law, and in favour o f  the public 
interest. But rules o f law which are protective o f the public interest may 
often work hardsh ip  in a specific case, and sometimes the wisdom o f the 
law as a statem ent o f the public interest will seem questionable to the 
judge. Formally and informally, a judge is given some latitude to balance 
private interests and public interests in a particular case. This 
responsibility is institutionalized in o u r system o f justice on the theory 
that such flexibility, within reasonable bounds, is in itself in the public 
interest. In o ther words, the ju d g e ’s first responsibility is the public 
interest, while his day to day specific focus is the private interest; the law 
gives him some flexibility to balance these potential conflicts. Judges are 
not unique am ong public authorities in this respect, but their function 
illustrates particularly well the public and private dem ands which society 
quite deliberately places upon many public authorities. M oreover, they 
make m ore specific decisions, and the consequences o f their specific
l4Jennings, supra, footnote 8, at 271-2.
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decisions — liberty o f the subject, transfers o f p roperty  and wealth — 
are often greater than those o f o th er public authorities.
With these substantial and frequently  exercised powers comes a 
great responsibility both to the general public and to the private 
individuals affected. Because the public interest is param ount, the 
generally acknowledged rationale for judicial im m unity from  to rt liability 
is also rooted in the public interest. Society ultimately asks judges to 
exercise their jud g m en t freely and independently , in the public interest. 
We do not ask that the ju d g e  be unsym pathetic to the private plea, but 
we insist upon his being independen t o f  private influences and  pressure. 
It follows, then, that when a judge decides anything it is in the public 
interest that his decision not be influenced consciously o r sub-consciously 
by the potential for personal liability. Otherwise, one would expect, at 
least in theory, that there would be a shift in judicial trends, to some 
degree, towards decisions which were less harm ful to the parties and 
hence less likely to expose a ju d g e  to liability. Presumably, this would be 
a shift away from the optim um  position where ju dgm en ts would be 
m ade purely in the public interest. . !
Against this view is the theory that by sanctioning at least certain 
types o f e rro r with tort liability, there  would be an incentive for the 
ju d g e  to take greater care to reach the correct decision, and hence a net 
benefit in the public interest. T h e  strength  o f this view depends in part 
upon w hether one believes that th ere  is, w ithout liability, less incentive 
for judges to take due care ,15 and in part, upon w hether one believes 
that there is in the majority o f  cases such a th ing as an objectively 
“correct” decision.
Society, for good reason, places ju d g es on a pedestal, and generally 
regards them  as com petent, dedicated, and worthy o f  their high public 
office. Although it does not necessarily follow that the reality accords 
with the perception, there is no reason to doubt that it generally does, 
and the selection o f  persons o f  exem plary character and ability for 
judicial positions may be the best m eans o f ensuring  that judicial 
functions will be conscientiously perfo rm ed . O ne also suspects that it 
would be a very unusual ju d g e  who was indifferent to the frequency 
with which his decisions were o vertu rned  on appeal, o r who would be 
im m une from the criticism which m ight accompany the appellate court’s 
opinion o r the disrespect which m ight accum ulate within the legal 
com m unity. A ju d g e’s good reputa tion  is his principal professional asset 
and it is in his interest to develop and  preserve it daily. Nevertheless, 
although the incidence o f gross m isconduct o r incom petence may be
'»By "optimal”, I mean a procedure which balances the costs o f perfection against the cost o f error and 
adopts a goal responsive to social values and financial costs. For example, nine member panels might 
improve the accuracy of decision making in a m inor traffic violation case, but the costs and delays 
would clearly outweigh the benefits. Similarly, a broadly phrased liability rule for judicial error might 
marginally increase the accuracy o f judicial decision making, but again these accuracy gains must be 
weighed against the costs discussed below.
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lower am ong the judiciary than am ong the general population, it would 
be naive to assume that it is nonexistent. T h e re  is, however, a sanction 
for this type o f  conduct th rough  form al16 o r inform al17 removal from 
office, which does serve a d e te rren t function, albeit not a com pensatory 
one. T h erefo re , even in the absence o f  potential liability there  are 
incentives for a judge to perform  his functions carefully in the public 
interest, and the argum ent that potential liability would significantly 
im prove perform ance is not convincing.
M oreover — leaving aside for the time being deliberate abuse o f 
authority  and gross erro rs  in clear cases — one has to inquire w hether 
there  really is such a thing as a “correct” decision as opposed to a 
com petent, fair, and honest exercise o f  judgm ent. T h e  “correct” limits o f  
a ju d g e ’s jurisdiction may be determ ined  afte r several levels o f  appeal 
and num erous d ifferen t views, so in that sense there is a correct solution 
to the question. However, it is absurd to suppose that potential tort 
liability will increase the chances that the ju d g e  o f first instance will 
arrive at that decision. Until the specific issue is ultimately resolved by a 
h igher court, it is m ore accurate to think o f  a range o f acceptable 
decisions ra th er than a correct decision, and it is within that range that 
im m unity serves the positive function o f allowing the judge to exercise 
his judgm ent independently  o f personal liability considerations.
It is, therefore, doubtful if potential liability would im prove judicial 
perform ance, while there  is at least a suggestion that it m ight decrease 
judicial ef ficiency in reaching decisions in accord with the public interest. 
T hat, then, is the general rationale for the immunity rule, and we shall 
defer for the m om ent the question w hether certain types o f decisions 
and certain types o f erro rs  could nevertheless be rendered  subject to tort 
sanction without underm ining  this rationale.
There are o ther factors supporting  a rule o f judicial immunity 
which deserve consideration. O ne o f the least discussed and most 
difficult to articulate is inherent in the institutional role o f courts and 
judges in society. It is absolutely crucial to a well-functioning democracy 
that the courts, as the independen t adm inistrators o f the general law o f 
the land and as the exercisers o f great power over individuals and over 
governm ents, be perceived as wise, fair, just, capable, responsible, or, 
generally, as above reproach. T h e  perception is just as im portant as the 
reality and the two are related, although d ifferent. T h e  narrow er the 
scope o f  judicial im munity, the greater the num ber o f  challenges one 
would expect from  private individuals, with a consequent erosion in the 
desired perception o f  the judiciary. T h e  detrim ental effect upon the
"See, for example. The Judges Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. J - l , s. 31, 32 (County Court Judges); The Supreme 
Court Act, R.S.C. 1970, e. S-19, s. 9 (Supreme Court Judges); The Provincial Courts Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 
369, s. 4 (Provincial Court Judges). See, also. Brazier, supra, footnote 5, at 399-404.
,TC)ne would expect that exposure o f gross misconduct would culminate in more resignations than 
formal removal procedures.
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public’s confidence in the judiciary would probably occur w hether o r not 
the suits b rought were justified and successful. T h erefo re , this negative 
effect m ust be balanced carefully against the anticipated benefits to the 
public in term s o f im proved judicial perform ance and to private citizens 
in term s o f com pensatory dam age awards.
Ironically, although there is probably great symbolic value in 
limiting the num ber o f circum stances w here a private individual may sue 
a ju d g e , there  is also a great risk in offending  the principle that no man 
should be above the law by virtue o f his position in society.18 T hus, in 
addition to the practical desirability o f  im posing personal sanctions upon 
judges who, for exam ple, deliberately exceed o r abuse their powers, 
there  is also a symbolic benefit in preserving liability in some 
circum stances so as to em phasize to society as a whole that the m en who 
develop and adm inister the law are not completely im munized from its 
penalties. T h e  issue o f where the boundaries o f im m unity ought to be 
draw n will be addressed herein, but at this point it should be 
em phasized that absolute immunity for all conduct in the pu rpo rted  
perform ance o f  the judicial function may be quite undesirable.
A nother factor which should be taken into account is the effect o f 
potential liability upon the judges themselves. In Sirros v. Moore, Lord 
D enning seemed to em phasize the ju d g e ’s personal interest in freedom  
and independence as m uch as the public’s interest. He said: “Each 
should be able to do his work in com plete independence and free from 
fear. He should not have to tu rn  the pages o f his books with trem bling 
fingers, asking himself: ‘If  I do this, shall I be liable in dam ages?’ He is 
not to be plagued with allegations o f malice o r ill will o r bias o r anything 
o f the kind.” ' 9
In response, it can be said that while precisely the same case can be 
m ade to support im m unity for most o ther public authorities, and indeed 
for most private individuals, the deterrence and com pensatory goals o f 
to rt law are thought to be m ore im portant. T h e  role o f  a ju d g e  does, 
however, d iffe r from  most o ther occupations, public and private, in 
term s o f its g reater exposure to liability. From case to case, and within 
each case, a ju d g e  makes num erous decisions o f a jurisdictional and 
non-jurisdictional natu re  which ultimately culm inate in action likely to 
affect personal liberty, p roperty  rights, and economic interests. His 
powers are great and exercised frequently. T hus, one would expect a 
considerably higher risk o f liability suits against judges than o ther 
professionals,20 even with a relatively restrictive liability rule. T he
‘"This is especially true in cases where judges develop the immunity rules which are to be applied to 
themselves.
1*Sufna, footnote 7, at 136.
20T here are o ther professions and occupations with similarly high exposure: doctors are a particularly
good example. However, there are other status differences which better able a doctor to protect himself
from the liability risk.
JUDICIAL IM M UNITY 81
recruitm ent o f qualified and em inent men for judicial positions is o f  the 
utm ost im portance, so the effect o f  this risk upon recruitm ent must be 
considered. Suppose one wished to recruit a successful practitioner for a 
judicial appointm ent. Is the prestige o f the position likely to com pensate 
him for loss o f income and for the financial risk and aggravation likely 
to accompany even a relatively restricted liability rule?
Related to the points already noted, but worthy o f independent 
consideration, is the somewhat unusual occupational status o f a judge. 
A lthough paid by governm ent, a judge is not an em ployee or servant o f 
the governm ent, which m eans in very practical term s that the 
governm ent is not vicariously liable for judicial torts, and hence that the 
ju d g e  personally bears all liability.21 T he  same is true  o f independent 
contractors and professionals, but those people have relative freedom  to 
choose which occupational tasks they wish to assume, and what fee they 
wish to charge to com pensate them  for a risk. A judge, like most o ther 
public authorities, is on salary, and un d er a public duty to perform  a 
variety o f functions, but unlike most public authorities, the public purse 
does not protect him from the consequences o f civil liability.22 T hus a 
judge lacks the traditional m eans o f protecting him self from tort 
liability; this also suggests that fairly extensive immunity is desirable.
Finally, it should be em phasized that an im munity rule must also 
control the potential for liability, as well as its actual consequences. It is 
the scope o f potential liability which will inhibit the free and 
independen t exercise o f the judicial function, and make recruitm ent 
m ore difficult. T h e  initiation and trial o f even unfounded  suits will have 
a negative impact upon the particular ju d g e , and the judicial system in 
general. T herefo re  a suitable im munity rule m ust be fairly broad in 
scope, and it must be worded as unam biguously as possible, so that 
exploratory o r vexatious suits are discouraged and may, if necessary, be 
struck out at the first opportunity .
*'This is true o f judges o r justices who act as inferior courts or as courts not o f  record, and is the main 
reason why t'.ie term "judge" has been defined to include magistrates and justices o f the peace, but to 
exclude qu?>i-judicial officers who are government employees. See Thompson v. Williams (1914), 32 W.N. 
(N.S.W.) 21 (S.C.N.S.W.). See also the legislative provisions denying the Crown's liability for the 
consequences o f torts committed in the discharge o r purported discharge o f judicial functions. Note that 
these sections cannot be avoided by proving jurisdictional error, or probably even knowing error, which 
in Lord Denning’s view would deprive an act o f its judicial character. Note also that the term judicial is 
not defined in the legislation. Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 239, s. 4(6); Proceedings 
Agamst the Crown Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. P140, s. 5(6); Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 365, 
s. 5(6); Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 87, s. 5(6); Crown Proceedings Act, S.B.C. 1974, c.
24, s. 3(2)(a); Proceedings Against the Croum Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-18, s. 4(6); Crown Proceedings Act, 
R.S.P.E.i. 1974, c. C-31, s. 5(6); Proceedings Against the Croum Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 285, s. 5(6); Proceedings 
Against the Croum Act, S.N. 1973, c. 59, s. 5(6); Croum Proceedings Act 1947, 10 & II Geo. 6, c. 44, s. 2(5).
**Administration of Justice Act 1964, 12 8c 13 Eliz. II, c. 42, s. 27.
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SUMMARY OF THE EXISTING SCOPE OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 
The Common Law
Although tort actions against judges have been considered by the 
courts over a period o f approxim ately four h u n d red  years, prior to 1975 
the English courts had failed to articulate any clear o r generally accepted 
principles, and the C anadian courts had scarcely considered the m atter 
at all.23 T h e  very age o f  the authorities cited by the m odern courts 
would call for a reexam ination o f the underlying principles, but beyond 
that, the principles tend to be expressed in obiter dicta, often 
contradictory, and usually so imprecisely worded as to be o f uncertain 
scope. So unhelpful are the o lder authorities that the judges o f the 
English C ourt o f  Appeal in Sirros v. M oore24 were unable to agree upon 
what the principles had been prio r to their decision, let alone agree 
upon what they ought to be in the twentieth century. Several authors 
have attem pted vigorous and detailed exam inations o f the cases on 
point, but, by their own admission, have had considerable difficulty in 
extracting any satisfactory set o f governing principles. T h ere  is little to 
be gained from  repeating  that exercise here; instead it is proposed to 
limit the com m on law sum m ary to an analysis o f  Sirros v. Moore. T hat 
approach has the advantage o f  revealing some o f  the conflicting 
interpretations o f the older authorities. M ore im portantly, the judgm ents 
provide a m odel o f analysis for a variety o f theories o f judicial im munity 
in trespass. A lthough it is theoretically possible to m aintain a 
non-trespass action against a superior court judge, there  are no m odern 
com m on law cases directly on point,25 and actions on the case against 
inferior court judges will be discussed later with reference to the 
relevant statutory provisions.26
It is worthwhile to set out the facts in Sirros v. Moore in some detail, 
because they are essential to understanding  the perpetually troublesom e 
definition o f the term  “jurisdiction” which haunts any action involving 
public authorities. T h e  plaintiff, an alien had been fined by a m agistrate 
who then recom m ended deportation, but o rdered  that the alien not be 
detained pending the Home Secretary’s decision regard ing  deportation. 
T h e  plaintiff appealed to the Crown C ourt, which in effect was 
em powered to conduct a rehearing and vary o r affirm  the o rd e r below
” See Foran v. Tatangello, supra, footnote 8; Crawford v. Beattie (1876), 39 U.C.Q.B 13. See also the cases 
cited infra, footnote 11. For a summary o f the common law as developed by state courts in the United 
States, see Cxmiment, supra, f<x>tnote 9. Two recent interpretations o f liability in the Federal jurisdiction 
are Pierson v. Ray, (1967) 87 S. Ct. 1213; 386 U.S. 843; Stump v. Sparkman (1978), 435 U.S. 439. These 
cases affirm a fairly broad immunity rule, imposing liability only for acts totally without jurisdiction 
which may then be characterized as non-judicial acts. The latter case in particular demonstrates how 
great the scope o f immunity is.
2*Supra, footnote 7.
“ Rubinstein, supra, footnote 9, at 319-323.
2tInfra, at 88-92.
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in any respect. Specifically, the Crown C ourt was em powered to 
recom m end deportation, and consequent upon that recom m endation, to 
o rder, o r not o rder, that the aiien be detained. T h e  ju d g e  o f  the Crown 
C ourt held — erroneously as it tu rn ed  ou t — that he had no jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal against the recom m endation for deportation. T h e  
ju d g e  announced that the appeal was dismissed, and then, seemingly as 
an afterthought, o rdered  that Sirros be detained. T he  effect o f his 
dismissing the appeal was to leave the m agistrate’s o rd e r intact; hence 
the Crown C ourt m ade no deporta tion  recom m endation, as was a 
condition precedent to a detention o rd e r.27 W hether this detention 
o rder, clearly invalid, was an e rro r  within o r w ithout the jurisdiction o f 
the Crown C ourt, is a point o f  some nicety to which we shall re tu rn  
shortly.
An o rd e r o f habeas corpus was gran ted  on the ground that the judge 
was functus officio.2* Upon his release Sirros issued a writ claiming 
dam ages to r trespass and false im prisonm ent against the ju d g e  and 
police officers involved. In the C ourt o f  Appeal all th ree judges upheld 
the defendan t’s application to strike out the action on the ground that it 
disclosed no reasonable cause o f action, but the reasons behind the 
decision differed. Lord Denning, with whom O rm rod L.J. essentially 
agreed, openly acknowledged that he was breaking from  the rules 
established in the o lder cases, as he in terp re ted  them . He held that any 
judge o f any court should be im m une from  tort liability for any act done 
in his official capacity unless the judge knowingly exceeded his 
jurisdiction. Buckley L.J. in terp re ted  the older authorities somewhat 
differently and arrived at a very com plex set o f  im munity rules. His 
expression o f these rules is obiter dicta because he decided the case on a 
relatively uncontroversial basis, holding that the judge had simply m ade 
a procedural e rro r within his jurisdiction.
T heir analysis o f the older authorities, which was somewhat less 
detailed than that o f Buckley L.J., led Lord Denning and O rm rod L.J. 
to conclude that the com m on law had always distinguished between 
superior and inferior courts for the purposes o f  special tort im m unity.29 
T hey seemed to agree that a superior court judge was im m une from  
civil liability for anything said o r done while acting judicially. T his 
immunity extended to acts done within o r without jurisdiction, and 
indeed “[n]o m atter that the judge was under some gross e rro r o r 
ignorance, o r was actuated by envy, hatred and malice, and all 
uncharitableness. . .”.30 Judges o f  inferior courts were personally liable 
for acts done outside their jurisdiction, except when they genuinely
t7Supra, footnote 7, at 181-2,prr Lord Denning.
**For a definition o f a superior court, see infra, at 92-93. 
3tSupra, footnote 7, at 132, per l/>rd Denning.
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believed on the facts that they had jurisdiction. T his would seem to 
protect the judge from  almost any e rro r o f fact com m itted in 
in terp re ting  the evidence, provided there was some evidence on point 
for his consideration.31 However, the ju d g e  o f an inferior court was 
liable for innocent e rro rs  o f law which caused him to exceed his 
jurisdiction. T h e  cause o f action arising from  an o rd e r m ade outside 
jurisdiction would generally be trespass.32
In Lord D enning’s view, inferior court judges were also liable “for 
acts done within their jurisdiction if done maliciously and without 
reasonable and probable cause”.33 T he basis o f this type o f action would 
not be trespass but case, and will be discussed herein .34 However, it is 
interesting to note that one au tho r has argued  most convincingly that it 
is not judges o f inferior courts, but judges not acting as a court o f 
record, who are potentially subject to this type o f suit.35
A fter recognizing the dichotom y between superior and inferior 
courts, Lord D enning and O rm rod L.J. concluded that it ought to be 
abandoned for the purposes o f tort law, and that the same liability rules 
ought to be applied to all judges and m agistrates.36 They adopted the 
broader immunity recognized as applying to superior court judges as the 
general rule — essentially absolute im munity for all acts done while 
perform ing a judicial function, within o r w ithout jurisdiction. Buckley 
L.J., in a sense, began where they concluded, because in his view the 
case law did not support a distinction between superior and inferior 
court judges.37 A lthough agreeing that the same rules ought to apply to 
all judges, he disagreed significantly with the scope o f that immunity. He 
expressed the possibilities, and their potential liability consequences as 
follows:38
So the following questions may arise: (1) Was the act non-judicial? (2) If the
act was, or purported to be, a judicial act, was it within the judge's
3,The plaintiff is not permitted to establish a jurisdictional fact in the tort suit contrary to the record in 
the original case. See Rubinstein, supra, footnote 9, at 323-4.
31W’hen the plaintiffs action is for pure economic loss or indirect damage the trespass action is o f no
use. It has been suggested that the plaintiff will have great difficulty in finding a useful cause o f action 
in these circumstances. See Rubinstein, supra, footnote 9, at 229-230. However, in recent times there has 
been a considerable widening of the negligence action to permit recovery for pure economic losses. 
Recovery for an intentional tort has also been permitted in a number o f  cases, albeit the basis for 
recovery has not always been clear. See Roncarelli v. Duplessis, supra, footnote 2; Grrshman v. Manitoba 
Vegetable Producers’ Marketing Board (1977), 69 D.L.R. (3d) I 14 (Man. C.A.).
33Supra, footnote 7, at 134.
34Infra, at 88-89.
3ilnfra, at 89.
3*Supra, footnote 7, at 136, per Lord Denning; at 149, per O rm rod L.J.
31!bid., at 141-143.
3*lbid., at 140-141.
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jurisdiction? (3) If the act purported to be a judicial act in the exercise o f a 
jurisdiction which the judge possessed and about the extent o f  which he was 
under no misapprehension, did the judge act as he did upon an erroneous 
judgment that the circumstances were such as to bring the case within the 
ambit o f  that jurisdiction? (4) If the act was not in truth within the judge's 
jurisdiction, did he act in a conscientious belief that it was within his 
jurisdiction, and, if so, (a) was this belief due to a justifiable ignorance o f  
some relevant fact or (b) due to a careless ignorance or disregard o f  some 
such facts, or (c) due to a mistake o f  law relating to the extent o f  his 
jurisdiction? He will, in my opinion, be immune in cases (2), (3) and (4) (a), 
but not otherwise.
Although Buckley L.J. avoided the term  “jurisdiction" in addressing 
the issue o f w hether o r not the term  was a judicial act, his test seems to 
am ount to asking w hether o r not the judge had “prelim inary 
jurisdiction”39 to perform  the act in question, and he later uses the term  
jurisdiction in this context.40 But he also uses the term  jurisdiction in 
questions (2), (3), and (4), and the term  is then being used in a different 
sense from  its use in question (1). For want o f a better term , this may be 
called “secondary jurisdiction” as opposed to “prelim inary jurisd iction”.
T his slippery term  has plagued adm inistrative law for many years, 
and the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional 
questions, as well as the distinction between the two types o f 
jurisdictional questions, is extrem ely difficult to draw. Indeed, one of the 
advantages o f the judgm ents o f Lord D enning and O rm rod L.J. is that 
they make this difficult exercise unnecessary. However, these distinctions 
have been relied upon in tort cases involving o ther public authorities,41 
and it is necessary to come to grips with them  in o rder to understand  
Lord Justice Buckley’s views.
Using the facts in Sirros as an example, one might address the 
prelim inary jurisdiction question by looking at the m atter as it stood at 
the outset o f  the case, and asking w hether the ju d g e  could (given certain 
findings o f fact, conclusions o f law, and procedural regularity) lawfully 
perform  the act in issue. Buckley L.J. dealt with this issue simply by 
observing that the ju d g e  did have jurisdiction to detain the alien if the 
subsequent conditions were complied with.42 T he  m atter would also have 
to be within the territorial com petence o f the court, within the limitation 
period, properly instituted by the p roper party, and, in a civil m atter, 
within the m onetary jurisdiction o f the cou rt.43 Facts might also come to 
light during  the course o f the action which were relevant to prelim inary 
jurisdiction; for example, the evidence might establish that an issue
J*See de Smith, Judicial Rruirw of Administration Action (3rd ed.), at 99-101.
*°Supra, footnote 7, at 143.
*'Supra, footnotes 2 and 3.
4*Supra, footnote 7. at 143.
43See de Smith, supra, footnote 41. at 100.
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which initially appeared  to be within the territorial com petence o f the 
court was upon fu rth e r exam ination found to be beyond it.44 In the view 
o f Buckley L.J., any e rro r o f prelim inary jurisdiction would deprive a 
judge’s act o f  its judicial character, and hence deprive the judge o f 
immunity.
O rm rod  L.j. distinguished between the two m eanings o f the term  
jurisdiction as follows: “. . . a distinction must be draw n between 
cjuestions which are strictly questions o f  jurisdiction [prelim inary 
jurisdiction] and questions which relate to the powers which the court 
can exercise in the course o f exercising its jurisdiction”.45 It is the latter 
type o f jurisdictional question which Buckley L.J. refers to in (2), (3), 
and (4). It is tem pting to use Sirros again as an exam ple and say, as Lord 
Denning and O rm rod L.J. seem to ,46 that although the Crown C ourt 
judge had prelim inary jurisdiction to detain Sirros, that power was only 
exercisable after a recom m endation for deportation, and hence, that the 
judge lacked jurisdiction in the second sense to make the o rder, having 
failed to satisfy the necessary precondition. U nfortunately — and this is 
a perfect illustration o f the futility o f attem pting to distinguish 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional cjuestions — Buckley L.J. classified 
the judge’s act as an e rro r o f procedure within his secondary 
jurisdiction, and hence im m une.47 He went on to say that even if the 
decision in such a case were particularly perverse o r irrational, the judge 
would still be im m une from  civil liability, although perhaps subject to 
removal from  office.
441 hat case must surelv be viewed as one where the court had jurisdiction to determine w hether or not 
the matter was indeed within its jurisdiction. For an example of how confusing this type o f jurisdictional 
question may be see Bell v. The Ontario Human Rights Commission and Carl McKay, (1971) S.C.R. 756, 
where prohibition was granted to prevent a Board o f Inquiry from proceeding to enquire whether or 
not a ( ornplaint was within its jurisdiction.
“Supra, footnote 7, at 150. In Anisminu Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 1 All K.R. 208, 
(H I..), at 213-214, Lord Reid drew the following distinction between questions o f preliminary 
jurisdiction, and other questions which would render a tribunal's decision a nullity, which correspond to 
questions o f so-called secondary jurisdiction:
It has sometimes been said that it is only where a tribunal acts without jurisdiction that its decision is a 
nullity. But in such cases the word "jurisdiction” has been used in a very wide sense, and I have come to 
the conclusion that it is better not to use the term except in the narrow and original sense o f the 
tribunal being entitled to enter on the enquiry in question. But there are many cases where, although 
the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course 
of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in 
bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course 
o f the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have 
misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to 
it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account 
something whic h it was required to take into account. O r it may have based its decision on some matter 
which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. 1 do not intend this list to 
In- exhaustive. But if it decides a question remitted to it for decision without committing any of these 
errors it is as much entitled to decide that question wrongly as it is to decide it rightly.
I'he con sequences o f  1m>i1i categories of error are identical for purposes of judicial review, and perhaps 
for that reason the term jurisdic tion is frequently used to inc lude all the examples given by Lord Reid.
4*Supra, footnote 7, at 137, per lo rd  Denning; at 150, per Orm rod L.J.
41Ibul . at 143-4.
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It is no easier to distinguish question (3) from  question (4) than it is 
to distinguish both from  questions (1) and (2). Question (3) seems to 
posit a situation w here the judge knows his jurisdiction, in the second 
sense, but erroneously concludes that the circum stances o f a case bring it 
within that jurisdiction. Since the ju d g e  knows his jurisdiction, this is an 
e rro r o f  judgm ent ra th er than an e rro r o f jurisdiction. As an example, 
he cites Hamond v. H ow ell48 where the judge knew he had jurisdiction to 
punish a m isdem eanor, but m ade an e rro r in judgm en t in concluding a 
m isdem eanor had been com m itted. Question (4) appears to contem plate 
the situation where the judge is in e rro r as to the scope o f his power, o r 
jurisdiction in the second sense. Questions (4)(a) and (c) are consistent 
with the rules which Lord D enning and O rm rod L.J. felt had applied 
previously to inferior courts, but (4)(b) seems to go somewhat fu rthu r, 
suggesting that due care ra ther than genuine belief is the required 
standard.
A lthough the following chart will not resolve the classification 
difficulties, it may enable the reader to recognize the distinctions as seen 
by Buckley L.J.
(1) Preliminary Jurisdiction
(Strict Loss o f Im m unity For Any Excess)
(2), (3), (4) Secondary Jurisdiction
(2) Error Within Jurisdiction  (3) Excess Of, B ut N o E rror
(Im m une) About Jurisdiction
(Im m une)
y
(4) Error About Jurisdiction
(a), (b) E rro r o f Fact (c) E rro r o f Law
(No im munity for (Strict Loss o f
lack o f reasonable and Im m unity)
probable cause)
A lthough the views o f Lord Denning and O rm rod L.J. represent 
the law as it now stands in England, the House o f  Lords has not yet 
ruled upon this new direction, and it is certainly open to o ther courts in 
o th er jurisdictions to reach an entirely d ifferent solution. Lord Justice 
Buckley’s views have been presented in detail mainly to illustrate the
4®( 1674), I Mod. 119. 184; (1677), 2 Mod. 218 (K.B.).
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possible distinctions in the scope o f judicial im munity. A fter a review o f 
the relevant statutory provisions these possible solutions will be tested 
against the factors which support judicial immunity.
Legislative Provisions
T h ere  are statutory provisions respecting the liability o f  certain 
judicial officers in all o f  the provinces o f  com m on law jurisdiction in 
C anada, as well as in England. In eight provinces the legislation governs 
provincial court judges, magistrates, and justices o f the peace;49 in 
Alberta justices o f the peace are excluded;50 in England the legislation 
specifically governs justices o f the peace.51 In addition, the British 
Columbia Suprem e C ourt is expressly accorded the protection o f  a 
superior court o f  record ,52 and the M anitoba C ourt o f  Q ueen’s Bench is 
given the same protection available to superior courts o f  record in 
England in 1870.53 Although Sirros v. Moore m ight be adopted  in British 
Columbia, in M anitoba the liability o f a judge o f the C ourt o f  Q ueen’s 
Bench will depend  upon which o f the conflicting views o f  the o lder 
com m on law is adopted.
T h e  C anadian statutes which deal with provincially appointed 
judicial officers are modelled upon the English The Justice's Protection Act 
1 8 4 8 . 54 T h e  full title o f  the Act (An Act to protect Justices o f  the Peace 
from  vexatious actions for Acts done by them  in execution o f their 
Office) suggests that it was passed for the purpose o f limiting groundless 
actions. As does most o f the Canadian legislation, it distinguishes 
between acts done with and without jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is not 
defined, so the same definitional problem s present in the common law 
are also present un d er the legislative schemes.
Consistent with the English legislation, when the act in issue was 
within the officer’s jurisdiction six provinces specify no action will lie 
unless the act was done maliciously and without reasonable and probable
i9The Provincial Courts Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 369, s. 1(a), s. 13; The Public Authorities Protectum Act, R.S.C).
1970, c. 374, s. 1; Provincial Court Act, R.S.P.K.I. 1974, c. P-24, s. 1(f), s. 1 I, as. am. S.P.E.I. 1975, c. 78, 
s. 1; The Justices and Other Public Authorities (Protection) Act, R.S.N'. 1970, c. 189, s. 2(b), s. 4; The Provincial 
Court Act, S.N. 1974, c. 77, s. 34(1); The Provincial Judges Act, S.M. 1972, c. 61, s. 1(6), s. 12; The 
Proinncial Court Act, S.S. 1978, c. 42, s. 2(f), 5(3), s. 23; The Proinncial Court Act, S.B.C. 1975, c. 57, s. I , s.
31 (s. 31 renum bered by S.B.C. 1977, c. 60, s. 37); The Justices' and Magistrates' Protection Act, R.S.N.S.
1967, c. 157. s. I, 2; The Judges of the Provincial Magistrate's Court Act, S.N.S. 1976, c. 13, s. 2(6); Protection 
oj Persons Acting Under Statute Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-20.
>0The Provincial Court Act, S.A. 1978, c. 70, s. 20(3); The Justices of the Peace Act, S.A. 1971, c. 57. 
ixThe Justices Protection Act IH4H, 1 1 & 12 Viet. c. 44.
' 2The Supreme Court Act, R.S.B.C. I960, t .  374, s. 5, as. am. 
i3The {¿ueen's Bench Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. 280, s. 6.
%4Supra, footnote 51
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cause.55 N either “malice” nor the presum ably equivalent term  “bad 
faith” which appears in the British Columbia legislation,56 is defined. 
Interestingly, in British Columbia and Prince Edward Island the 
legislation reads “malice or w ithout reasonable and probable cause,”57 
and depend ing  upon how that word is in terp re ted , those statutes may 
recognize a far narrow er im m unity rule than the o thers.58 In New 
Brunswick, there  is no specific statutory reference to an action on the 
case. Instead there is a prohibition against any action being brought 
against an officer acting within jurisd iction .59 It is always possible to 
argue that a knowing o r malicious e rro r in itself takes the officer out o f  
his jurisdiction, but the distinctive natu re  o f the New Brunswick 
legislation suggests that this approach was not in tended by the 
legislature.60
None o f  this legislation is as clear as it m ight be, because while at 
least eight provinces and England recognize an action on the case for 
e rro rs  com m itted within jurisdiction, none specifies clearly the elem ents 
o f that action. Assuming one could determ ine the com m on law in the 
n ineteenth  century, were the Acts in tended to change it o r confirm  it?61 
M oreover, the Acts are worded in the negative, raising the possibility 
that malice and want o f  reasonable and probable cause are necessary, 
but not always sufficient, criteria o f  liability. It has been argued that the 
absolute im m unity in the com m on law for e rro rs  within jurisdiction 
com m itted by justices acting as courts o f  record would protect an 
English justice o f the peace from  an action o f malicious conviction, 
notw ithstanding the legislation.62 T hus, m uch o f the uncertainty o f the 
com m on law rem ains with the legislation, and the same is true  o f the 
legislation governing erro rs o f jurisdiction.
Dealing with erro rs  com m itted without or in excess o f  jurisdiction, 
there  are basically two d ifferen t legislative schemes. In three provinces,
isThe Public Authorities Protection Act, R.S.C). 1970, c. 374, s. 2; The Justices and Other Public Authorities 
(Protection) Act, R.S.N. 1970, c. 189. s. 5; The Justices' and Magistrates' Protection Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 157, 
s. 3; The Provincial Court Act, S.S. 1978, c. 42, s. 23; The Promncial Court Act, S.A. 1978, c. 7(1, s. 2(1(3);
The Proitncial Judges Act, S.M. 1972, c. 61, s. 12.
**The Promncial Court Act, S.B.C. 1975, c. 57, s. 31, as am. S.B.C. 1977, c. 60, s. 37.
57Ibid., Provincial Court Act, R.S P.E.I. 1974, c. P-24, s. 11.
58If the "or" is intended to be read disjunctively, the plaintiff could succeed by proving simple
negligence. While there would seem to be some significance to the choice o f "or" instead o f "and", 
which appears in the English model, it is difficult to imagine the legislatures creating such a broad 
liability base, never recognized at common law.
5®Protection o f Persons Acting Under Statute Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-20.
*°There is common law authority before 1848 in England which recognized the action on the case, most 
clearly when the judge was not acting as a court o f record. See Thompson, supra, footnote 6, at 528. In ^  
view o f the statute, it is difficult to argue that such authority has survived in New Brunswick.
"'See Thompson, supra, footnote 6, at 528-533.
“ Ibid.
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the legislation requires p roof o f  malice and reasonable and probable 
cause, just as for the e rro r within jurisdiction.63 Interestingly, this creates 
b roader judicial immunity than that which Buckley L.J. felt was available 
to superior court judges, o r that which Lord D enning felt was available 
to certain inferior courts at com m on law,64 and may now be roughly 
similar to the im munity for all but knowing e rro r expressed by Lord 
D enning and O rm rod L.J. in Sirros v. Moore.65
In th ree o ther provinces, the com m on law relating to jurisdictional 
e rro r is affirm ed and the legislation states that it is not necessary to 
prove malice o r want o f reasonable and probable cause.66 T herefore, 
unless these provinces adopt the decision in Sirros v. Moore, there will be 
strict liability in trespass for jurisdictional e rro r. In New Brunswick, 
there is simply a prohibition against suing a judge for an act perform ed 
within jurisdiction, and presum ably the effect is the same as in the th ree  
provinces noted immediately above.67 In M anitoba and Prince Edward 
Island the phrase “in the execution o f  his duties” appears in otherwise 
similar legislation.68 If that phrase is in terpreted  as m eaning “within 
jurisdiction” there would either be strict liability in trespass, o r liability 
for knowing erro r, depend ing  upon w hether o r not Sirros v. Moore were 
adopted. But it can also be argued that the phrase is m eant to include 
the pu rp o rted  exercise o f  jurisdiction, in which case the legislatures may 
have contem plated liability only when the act loses its judicial character, 
as w here the judge knowingly exceeds jurisdiction.
It is interesting to note that the federal Criminal Code, and legislation 
in several provinces perm its the reviewing court, upon quashing a 
conviction, to issue an o rd e r immunizing the judge who m ade the e rro r 
from  tort liability.69 For example, the O ntario  legislation reads as 
follows:
7.(1) Where an order is made quashing a summary conviction, the court may 
provide that no action shall be brought against the justice o f  the peace who 
made the conviction or against the informant or any officer acting thereunder 
or under any warrant issued to enforce the conviction or order.
•■'See The Provincial Court Act, S.S. 1978, c. 42, s. 23; The Provincial Court Act, S.B.C. 1975, c. 57, s. 31, as. 
am. S.B.C. 1977, t .  60. s. 37; The Provincial Court Act, S.A. 1978, t. 70. s. 20(3).
**Supra, at 84-88.
*slnfra, at 102.
**See The Puhlu Authorities Protection Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 374, s. 3; The Justices and Other Public Authorities 
(Protection) Ad. R.S.N. 1970, c. 189, s. 5; The Justices' and Magistrates' Protection Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 157,
s. 3.
•7Supra, footnote 61. See also supra, at 88-89.
••See Provincial Court Act, R.S.P.F..I. 1974, t .  P-24, s. II; The Provincial Judges Act, S.M. 1972, c. 61, s. 12.
*®See The Publu Authorities Protection Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 374, s. 7(1); The Justices and Other Public 
Authorities <Protection) Act, R.S.N. 1970, c. 189, s. 14(1); The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 717.
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(2) Such an order may be made conditional upon payment o f  the costs o f  
the motion to quash or upon such other condition as may be considered 
proper.
It will be argued subsequently that the action on the case is 
preferable to the trespass basis o f  judicial liability. However, if trespass 
liability were to be m aintained, then there  is m uch to recom m end such 
provisions whereby an action for an innocent e rro r o f jurisdiction may 
be precluded by the same judge who determ ines the e rro r, hence 
elim inating the groundless suit at the earliest possible opportunity . T he 
o ther advantage, which obtains equally if the trespass suit is abandoned 
altogether, is that the reviewing court may exercise its public duty 
without taking into account in any way the private liability which may 
otherwise flow from the decision to quash .70
Finally, in England there is statutory provision for indem nifying 
justices for costs and dam ages incurred in tort proceedings, with 
indem nity being m andatory if the justice acted reasonably and in good 
faith .71 Since these elem ents would be fatal to an action upon the case, 
the utility o f  the provisions depends largely upon the continued 
recognition o f  the trespass action. T he  provisions are, however, 
responsive to o n e72 but not all o f  the rationales for judicial im munity, and 
may reflect the governm ent’s desire to treat justices m ore as o ther public 
authorities than as superior court judges o r courts o f  record.
In sum m ary, the com m on law before Sirros v. Moore imposed strict 
liability in trespass for jurisdictional e rro rs  com m itted by any court in 
the view o f Buckley L.J., o r by inferior courts in Lord D enning’s and 
Lord Justice O rm ro d ’s view. T h e  legislation in England, and in all but 
the three C anadian provinces which insist upon an action on the case, 
contem plates the application o f the com m on law, with the precise 
in terpretation o f the common law being an open question at the 
m om ent in Canada. In  England and all o f  the provinces except probably 
New Brunswick, the legislation appears to contem plate liability for any 
judicial e rro r com m itted with malice and /o r want o f reasonable and 
probable cause. At com m on law it appears that superior court judges, o r 
perhaps courts o f  record, were im m une from  this type o f liability, 
although in Lord Justice Buckley’s view an e rro r o f fact com m itted 
without reasonable and probable cause would not allow im munity. T hus,
10lnfra, at 100-101.
1,The Administration of Justice Act 1964, c. 42, s. 27 (L'.k.).
7,The lack o f  financial backing for potential liability is one o f the main reasons why the term "judge" was 
defined for the purposes o f this article to include justices o f the peace. Supra, footnote 5. Again, the 
desirability o f treating officers who perform quasi-judicial functions differently from superior court 
judges or judges o f courts o f record, has not been considered in this article. If a distinction is justified, 
the indemnity provisions are one argument for treating justices similarly to quasi-judicial officers. In 
Sirros v. Moore, supra, footnote 7, and Foran v. Talangello, supra, footnote H, the courts took the view that 
no distinction between justices o f  the peace and higher court judges was justified.
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although the legislation differs from  the common law, the same factors 
— classification o f court, classification o r erro r, standard o f care, and 
motive — are relevant to the determ ination o f the scope o f im munity.
ANALYSIS OF THE LIMITING FACTORS 
Classification of the Court
As m entioned previously, there was am ple judicial support p rio r to 
Sirros v. Moore, 73 and statutory authority  in most jurisdictions, to the 
effect that the scope o f  judicial immunity would vary with the 
classification o f the court. T h e  predom inant distinctions were those 
draw n between inferior and superior courts, and those draw n between 
courts of, and not of, record, with the latter distinction being 
particularly relevant to the action on the case.
In Sirros v. Moore all th ree judges concluded that judicial im munity 
should hot depend upon w hether a court were classified as superior o r 
in ferio r.74 Lord D enning and O rm rod L.J. took the position that the 
classification recognized at com m on law ought to be abandoned in 
m odern  times, and that the same protection afforded to superior court 
judges ought to be extended to judges o f  all courts.75 It was the view o f 
Buckley L.J. that the com m on law had never articulated a rule which 
distinguished between the two types o f  courts, but interestingly, he 
indicated that the rule was perhaps applied differently to judges o f  
superior courts, by tending to classify their erro rs as erro rs o f  ju d g m en t 
ra th er than jurisdiction.76 It is not clear w hether Buckley L.J. agreed 
with this tendency which he recognized, but his actual classification o f 
the e rro r at issue in Sirros m ight be viewed as an exam ple o f  it.77 Surely, 
if a distinction in practice is justified it would be preferable to recognize 
it in theory ra ther than to disguise it in the classification maze.
T h e  d iffering  treatm ent o f  superior and inferior courts in the past 
again tu rns upon the elusive concept o f  jurisdiction. It has been said that 
a “. . . superior court is in one sense a court which is presum ed to have 
jurisdiction until the contrary is established by evidence; in the o ther 
sense it is a court which cannot be restrained by prohibition from
*3Supra, footnote 7.
7‘These terms are defined infra, at 92-93.
75See also Furan v. Tatangello, supra, footnote 8. Note that Lord Denning indicates that he would treat all
|iidges including justices of the peace alike, w ithout reference to The Justice's Protection Act 1848, supra, 
footnote 51.
’’Buckley I..J. classified the e rro r as an erro r o f procedure w ithin jurisdiction.
7“S'upra, footnote 7, at 141.
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exceeding its ju risdiction”.78 A lthough the au th o r did not specify, it 
seems he in tended the term  jurisdiction to include prelim inary 
jurisdiction, and probably secondary jurisdiction as well.79 T h e  argum ent 
would then be that as the arbiter o f his own jurisdiction a ju d g e  o f a 
superior court can never exceed it, but can only com m it an e rro r within 
it.80 Technically this is a tenable position, but as a m atter o f  common 
sense a superior court is as m uch bound by law as any o th er court, and 
the rejection o f this argum ent on that basis by Lord D enning81 and 
O rm rod L.J.82 is far m ore convincing.
Once that technical distinction is put aside, there  is little reason for 
distinguishing between the two levels o f  courts. O ften  the functions o f 
and precise subject m atter dealt with by superior and inferior courts are 
identical, and often judges o f both types sit in the same co u rt.83 Even 
where the subject m atters d iffer, as where an inferior court has a limited 
sentencing power o r m onetary jurisdiction, the difference is m ore o f  
degree than o f kind. M oreover, as Sirros indicates, the classification o f 
certain courts as superior o r inferior is by no m eans a simple and certain 
process,84 and it seems absurd that liability should depend upon such an 
irrelevant and elusive criterion. It is subm itted that the abandonm ent o f 
this distinction in both theory and practice is a welcome developm ent.
W hereas the distinction between superior and inferior courts may 
have determ ined trespass liability at com m on law, the distinction 
between courts of, and not of, record85 may have fixed liability for 
malicious judicial acts. O ne au tho r has argued convincingly from  the 
older authorities that judges were absolutely im m une from  liability for 
malice when acting as a court o f  record .86 Leaving aside for the time 
being the questions o f  whether, and when, malice ought to be an 
appropria te  basis for an action, it is interesting to consider the au th o r’s 
rationale for the distinction. He argues that the com m on law has never 
extended immunity for malicious acts to officers, o ther than judges, who
78Supra, footnote 6, at 520-521.
7*These terms are defined supra, at 85-86.
*°.Supra, footnote 7, at 139-140.
"Ibui., at 135.
"Ibid., at 148-9.
83This was true in the case o f the Crown Court discussed in Sirros. Ibid., at 136.
MFor example. Buckley L.J. thought the Crown Court was sitting as an inferior court in Sirros; Ormrod 
L.J. thought it a superior court; and Lord Denning noted the difficulty without resolving it. Ibid., at 
143. 150, and 136-7.
85 A court o f  record “. . . is defined by reference to the functions it exercises. It is a court which has 
jurisdiction to fine and imprison or a court with jurisdiction to try civil causes according to the common
law in matters involving forty shillings or m ore.” Supra, footnote 6. at 521.
"Ibid., at 520-533.
perform  quasi-judicial functions,87 and he then suggests that judges not 
acting as a court o f  record m ore closely resemble quasi-judicial 
authorities than they do  judges acting as courts o f  record. It is probably 
true that a distinction based, for example, on the power to im prison and 
fine, poses m ore o f a difference in kind than the distinction between 
superior and inferior courts, which often poses only a difference in 
degree o f the same type o f power. T herefo re , if the scope o f judicial 
immunity were to depend upon a classification o f  d ifferent types o f 
courts o f law, the distinction between courts of, and not of, record is 
preferable to the superior — inferior court distinction for both trespass 
and case liability. But the argum ent in support o f  that distinction 
depends upon w hether quasi-judicial officers ought to be granted lesser 
immunity than judges, a m atter o f some debate.88 M oreover, even if 
quasi-judicial officers are to be treated differently, Lord D enning’s 
argum ents for treating judges o f both superior and inferior courts alike 
would seem also to apply to judges in courts of, and not of, record .89
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Classification of the Error
1 he ju d g m en t o f Buckley L.J. in Sirros v. M oore90 presents a detailed 
system for the classification o f  e rro r. T h e  legislation governing most 
inferior court judges often differentiates between jurisdictional erro rs 
and o thers.91 Lord D enning and O rm rod  L.J. also distinguish between 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors, limiting liability to knowing 
erro rs of jurisdiction. However, the “knowing” elem ent is m ore 
conveniently discussed as a standard  o f care concept,92 so the view o f 
Buc kley L.J. is em ployed as the model o f discussion below.
87T he distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative functions is a very difficult one to draw. A 
working definition o f a quasi-judicial function may be arrived at by assuming the tribunal is exercising 
its function in the Province o f Ontario, and then asking whether or not The Statutory Powers Procedure 
Act, S.C). 1971, c. 47 would apply. For these purposes the tribunals mentioned in section 2(d), (e), and 
(/), would also be included. Tbis approach concentrates upon functions which so closely resemble courts 
o f law that it is thought desirable to insist upon rather vigorous procedural safeguards similar to those 
available in a court o f law.
""See Brazier, supra, footnote 5.
88 Although the functions o f judges and quasi-judicial officers, and the effects upon the individuals of 
their acts, may not differ in such a meaningful way as to support different liability principles, it may be
socially undesirable to extend broad immunity to such a rapidly expanding class of civil servants. The 
classification line might then be drawn to separate independent judicial officers from civil servants; or,
it might be drawn as Thompson suggests to separate courts of, and not o f record; or, some other 
criteria might lie adopted. While at the moment I confess to preferring the first distinction, I openly 
admit that the issues deserve further examination, particularly with reference to the quasi-judicial 
official. While 1 cannot categorically deny the utility o f Thompson's distinction, in defence, I would 
suggest that he has not considered its full implications either.




T h e first and strongest criticism o f a classification system similar to 
the one Buckley L.J. suggests is that it is trem endously complex and 
difficult to apply in practice. O ne wonders w hether liability ought to 
depend upon such am biguous distinctions; and, if the distinctions really 
are that difficult to draw, there  is a risk that the classification o f  erro r 
will m ore likely be used to support the outcom e in a case than to 
determ ine it. Buckley L.J. almost admits as m uch.93 C onsider his 
determ ination that the judge in Sirros must have put his mind to the 
question o f w hether to detain the alien, and then simply adopted the 
wrong procedure. It follows then that this was an e rro r within 
jurisdiction, and im m une. But he m ight have held that the judge lacked 
prelim inary jurisdiction because he was functus officio. O r, he might have 
classified this as an e rro r as to the extent o f  his jurisdiction, and then 
possibly have held the judge disentitled to immunity. Once the e rro r is 
classified as jurisdictional o f the second o rder, the fu rth e r determ ination 
o f w hether the e rro r was one o f fact o r law arises, and if o f  fact, 
w hether justifiable o r careless. It appears that the judge will be strictly 
liable for excess o f prelim inary jurisdiction and for excess o f secondary 
jurisdiction produced by an e rro r o f law, but liable only for want o f 
reasonable and probable cause with an excess o f secondary jurisdiction 
produced by an e rro r o f fact. Surely there must be a m ore persuasive 
justification o f these complex and uncertain form ulas than the reasons 
in the judgm ent o f Buckley L.J.
So the question which rem ains is w hether, notw ithstanding the 
complexity and uncertainty o f  the classification o f e rro r scheme, this 
classification is necessary in o rd e r to rationalize the degree o f judicial 
im munity to be granted. S tarting with the clearest situation first, 
consider the case w here the judge has, and knows he has, prelim inary 
jurisdiction to make an o rd er, and knows what factual and legal 
determ inations will support the order. T he  question before him is 
w hether, in his judgment, he ought to make such an order. Clearly, if 
immunity is ever necessary to preserve free and independent judicial 
decision making, it is necessary in this case.
Next, consider the same situation, except assum e that the judge, 
exercising his judgm ent within jurisdiction, commits a procedural error. 
This is how Buckley L.J. classified the judge’s detention o f the alien in 
Sirros, in granting the judge immunity. It is possible to regard these two 
examples simply as variations o f judicial acts done within jurisdiction 
and to immunize them  both on that basis. However, while it seems 
highly desirable to support the free and independent exercise o f  judicial 
judgm ent on a substantive m atter, it is not so easy to argue that the 
same freedom  and independence ought to govern a judge’s choice o f 
procedure. N or is it accurate to classify an e rro r o f procedure as less 
im portant than an e rro r of, for example, jurisdiction, per se; recall that 
the e rro r which Buckley L.J. regarded as procedural was nevertheless
*3Supra, footnote 7, at 141.
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sufficient to support habeas corpus. 94 It m ight be preferable to deal with 
procedural e rro rs  within jurisdiction by arguing  that such erro rs are not 
the cause o f  the p lain tiffs loss. For example, the choice o f the wrong 
procedure in Sirros was not the cause o f the alien’s detention; indeed it 
was the basis o f  his release. H ad the ju d g e  in Sirros really put his m ind 
to the issue o f  w hether he ought to vary the m agistrate’s o rd e r and 
detain the alien, and had he then chosen the p ro p er procedure, the 
alien would have suffered a longer detention than he in fact did. A 
party is entitled to procedural regularity, but it does not follow that 
irregularity will be the cause o f  actionable dam age.95
It is beyond controversy, however one analyses the decisions on 
point, that provided a case can be classified as an e rro r o f judgm en t o r 
procedure within jurisdiction, there will be immunity from  tort liability. 
T he  extent to which this immunity ought to be extended to erro rs o f 
jurisdiction, prim ary o r secondary, is a m ore difficult issue to resolve. In 
Sirros, all th ree judges attached significance to the classification o f an 
e rro r as jurisdictional, arriving at two differen t propositions. Lord 
D enning would not im m unize a judge who knowingly exceeded his 
jurisdiction, and he does not appear to distinguish between prelim inary 
and secondary jurisdiction for this purpose.96 Buckley L.J. would not 
im m unize any act in excess o f prelim inary jurisdiction, regardless o f  how 
that e rro r occurred; and he would not immunize negligent erro rs  o f 
fact, nor any erro rs o f  law, going to questions o f  secondary 
jurisdiction.97 W hat is the reason for the distinction between 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors?
If  questions o f  prelim inary jurisdiction were always clear and easily 
resolved, the distinction m ight make sense,98 but a jurisdictional 
question can be as difficult as any other. It is therefore meaningless to 
speak o f the “correct” jurisdictional determ ination as an obvious 
absolute.99 Potential liability is m ore likely to affect the accuracy o f 
jurisdictional determ inations adversely than positively.100
•^Although Buckley L.J. characterizes the case differently from Lord Denning and Orm rod LJ., his 
silence on point presumably indicates he agrees that habeas corpus was properly granted.
95In several provinces damages against provincial judges are limited to a nominal amount by statute, in
the absence o f a substantial as opposed to a technical harm. See The Public Authorities Protection Act, 
R.S.O. 1970, c. 874, s. 9; The Justices and Other Public Authorities (Protection) Act, R.S.N. 1970, c. 189, s. 15; 
The Justices' and Magistrates' Protection Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 157, s. 16.
®*Supra, footnote 7, at 186; infra, at 102.
t7Supra, at 84-87.
•'They would make sense with a standard o f care approach rather than a trespass approach, however.
**Supra, at 79.
100T he other rationales for judicial immunity, suggested supra, at 76-81, would also apply.
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There is, however, a conceptual distinction between jurisdictional 
and non-jurisdictional questions which at first glance m ight seem to 
support a d ifferen t liability rule. T h e  exercise o f  judgm en t within 
jurisdiction is the very essence o f  a ju d g e ’s function, and it is that free 
and independen t exercise o f judgm en t within legal bounds which society 
values. No public interest is served by giving a ju d g e  freedom  and 
independence to determ ine his own jurisdiction.
T h e  force o f that argum ent is somewhat dissipated, however, when 
one considers that in the first instance, it falls upon the ju d g e  to exercise 
his judgm ent on factual and legal questions which determ ine w hether o r 
not he has jurisdiction to perform  the act in question. N otwithstanding 
the adm itted qualitative difference between jurisdictional and non- 
jurisdictional questions, there  is the same public interest in having the 
ju d g e  determ ine both m atters free and independent o f  potential 
personal liability. M oreover, although appeal and judicial review will not 
usually com pensate the victim o f  the jurisdictional erro r, they do protect 
the public’s interest in jurisdictional con tro l.101 It is, after all, this public 
interest which distinguishes jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional ques­
tions; the aggrieved individual is likely to be indifferent to w hether the 
source o f his dam age was an e rro r within o r without jurisdiction.
T h e  real significance o f the jurisdictional e rro r lies in its 
relationship with the trespass action. Any interference with the person 
o r property  o f  ano ther is a prim a facie  trespass for which the defendant 
will be held strictly liable unless he establishes a defence. Liability is strict 
in the sense that any e rro r as to the circumstances which give rise to the 
defence, however reasonable and innocent, will destroy the defence. T h e  
strength  o f the argum ent o f  Buckley L.J. in favour o f strict liability for 
jurisdictional e rro r is its consistency with the ordinary law o f trespass as 
applied to private citizens: any e rro r as to the scope o f judicial authority 
is resolved strictly against the judge, and renders him liable in trespass. 
T his is also the very weakness o f the argum ent, because it entirely 
ignores the special judicial role.
Buckley L.J. reasoned that an act done without prelim inary 
jurisdiction is not a judicial act, and therefore attracts no im munity. 
T h at proposition is m ore attractive as a m atter o f semantics than o f logic 
or policy. Suppose counsel bring a case before a judge, argue at length 
over w hether he has jurisdiction, and then the ju d g e  concludes after 
careful consideration o f all the authorities on point that he does have 
jurisdiction. Should a h igher court’s determ ination that he was in e rro r 
deprive this process o f its judicial character, let alone expose the judge  
to personal liability in tort? Surely he is perform ing a judicial function in 
determ ining the jurisdictional point in the first instance. #
,0'Supra, footnote 7, at 141, per O rm rod L.J.
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M oreover, it is the very fact that the judge has a public duty to 
make the jurisdictional determ ination in any case which comes before 
him, as well as a fu rth e r duty to in terfere with the person o r property  o f 
the subject, which distinguishes him from  the private citizen. It is one 
thing to affirm  the value o f  personal security by perm itting a private 
citizen to in terfere with ano ther only in exceptional circumstances, and 
entirely at his peril. Peace in the realm, and the integrity o f its subjects 
are best preserved by discouraging such action. But surely it is an 
entirely d iffe ren t m atter to propose that the same principle govern 
judicial officers who are obligated by the public interest to in terfere with 
the liberty o f  subjects.
Recall that in Lord Justice Buckley’s view, liability for an e rro r o f  
law going to secondary jurisdiction would be strict, as with an e rro r o f 
prelim inary jurisdiction, whereas an e rro r o f fact would be judged on 
the negligence standard. A lthough the distinction between erro rs  o f law 
and fact has been recognized in several older cases, there  is no 
com pelling reason for the distinction: it is nebulous at best, and there is 
no difference in the degree o f potential difficulty o f the issue o r the 
severity o f the consequences o f erro r. It is desirable to eliminate the 
rehearing  o f all factual determ inations in the subsequent tort suit, but it 
is equally desirable to elim inate the rehearing o f legal issues o f 
seco nd ar y j  u r  isd ict ion.
Buckley L.J. does not attem pt to rationalize the distinction between 
questions o f prelim inary and secondary jurisdiction, but O rm rod L.J. in 
obiter dicta indicates that, were inferior courts to be held liable for 
jurisdictional errors, then he would limit that liability to erro rs o f 
prelim inary jurisdiction in o rd e r to preserve some m eaningf ul scope for 
judicial im m unity.102 This theory seems reminiscent o f a view once 
prevalent in adm inistrative law by which jurisdiction m eant prelim inary 
jurisdiction, and nothing m ore. T h e  erroneous exercise o f a power within 
that jurisdiction m ight be appealable, but would not be subject to judicial 
review. T he  theory was that prelim inary jurisdiction granted the 
jurisdiction to exercise the given powers, rightly o r wrongly. But the 
distinction has now lost all significance in adm inistrative law, and 
virtually any e rro r which a tribunal might make may now be regarded 
as jurisdictional. Indeed, the m odern trend  is perhaps entirely to dismiss 
the requirem ent that an e rro r be jurisdictional as a precondition for 
judicial review .103 In view o f these developm ents in adm inistrative law, 
the judge’s desire to limit the definition o f the term  jurisdiction with 
regard  to liability is quite understandable.
'°*lbid., at 150.
103For a general summary of the development o f the jurisdictional concept, and the erosion o f its 
significance, see de Smith. Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed.) at 94-106. See also Federal 
Court Ad, R.S.C. 1970, c. 10, s. 28; Amsminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, supra, footnote 45; 
Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School, [1979) I All E.R. 365, at 372 (C.A.) per Lord 
Denning.
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This leads one to doubt w hether the distinction suggested by 
O rm rod  L.J. would be any m ore likely to survive in the law o f torts than 
in the law o f  judicial review. Cynically, it m ight be pointed out that the 
courts’ expansion o f the jurisdiction concept in adm inistrative law may 
have been motivated by their desire to increase their supervisory powers 
over a growing segm ent o f governm ental regulation o f society. In 
contrast; it m ight be supposed that they would narrow  the concept to 
minimize their own liability risk. Even were this an accurate prediction, 
it would be undesirable to define the elusive concept o f  jurisdiction 
differently  in public and private law.
T h ere  is, however, a less cynical and m ore relevant explanation for 
the expansion o f the concept o f  jurisdiction in adm inistrative law. It is 
apparen t that the determ ination o f prelim inary jurisdiction may be just 
as difficult, and the consequences o f  e rro r just as severe, as the 
determ ination  o f e rro rs  going to secondary jurisdiction o r substance. 
T h e  distinction between the two types o f  jurisdictional question is not 
responsive to the policies underlying judicial im munity, nor to the 
private interest o f the party aggrieved. The distinction in adm inistrative 
law depends not so m uch upon the inherent nature o f  jurisdiction as it 
does upon the intent o f  the legislative body which created the public 
authority: were the courts, o r the authority  itself, in tended to have the 
final word upon a particular issue?104 T his is a far less relevant 
consideration when the courts’ supervision o f one ano ther is in issue. 
W ithin this context, the distinction between prelim inary and secondary 
jurisdic tion is neither certain, n o r m eaningful.
In sum m ary, most o f the distinctions suggested by Buckley L.J. are 
not supportable, either with reference to the potential plaintiff o r to the 
rationales for judicial immunity. T h e  significance o f the classification o f 
an e r ro r  as jurisdictional, even assum ing the term  may be defined with 
certainty, lies in its relationship to the trespass action. But the trespass 
action itself is objectionable on two counts. First, it seems entirely 
inappropria te  to impose strict liability for jurisdictional e rro r, however 
bona f id e  and careful, upon officers who are un d er a public duty to 
com m it prima facie  trespasses. Secondly, jurisdictional erro rs are not 
uncom m on, so the trespass action, properly in terp re ted , creates a 
disproportionately wide ambit o f  actual liability.
Actual liability has been controlled in the past by distinguishing 
between inferior and superior courts, and either im m unizing superior 
courts for jurisdictional e rro r, o r classifying their e rro rs  as within 
jurisdiction.105 But neither the classification o f the court, nor the elastic 
use o f  the concept o f  jurisdiction, can be supported  on any o ther
104T he jurisdictional question is crucial, for example, in cases where the courts interpret privative 
clauses. See, for example, Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, supra, footnote 45.
,0SThese two views are put forth by I.ord Denning and Buckley L.J. respectively in Sirros v. Moore, supra, 
footnote 7.
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ground beyond its function as a crude limiting factor. If  possible, it 
would be desirable to develop limiting form ulas with m ore rational bases 
than these.106
It is interesting to note the legislative provisions in some 
jurisdictions whereby a judge in quashing a decision o f an inferior court 
may grant an o rd e r protecting the ju d g e  in e rro r from  civil liability.107 
These provisions serve a function in public law because they free the 
reviewing judge from  considering the liability consequences to the ju d g e  
below, should he determ ine a jurisdictional e rro r had been com m itted. 
However, the provisions would be entirely unnecessary if the trespass 
basis o f  the action were abandoned. M oreover, these provisions appear 
to reflect an open acknowledgm ent that strict liability in trespass is an in­
appropriate  basis for judicial liability. T h ere  is very little ju risp rudence 
indicating when the protection o rd e r should be granted, but what there 
is dem onstrates that the courts consider the standard  o f  care and motive 
o f  the judge in e r ro r .108 T h ere  is one advantage to approaching 
im proper motive o r breach o f  standard  in this m anner, ra ther than 
directly th rough a specified action on the case: that groundless suits may 
be precluded at the earliest possible stage.109 But ironically, the trespass 
suit as defined without reference to this legislation will only be 
groundless if the judge has not com m itted a jurisdictional e rro r, and 
provided the jurisdictional determ ination is a precondition o f the tort 
suit, the protection o rd e r is unnecessary. A lthough in theory the basis o f 
the trespass action based upon jurisdictional e rro r is far wider than the 
basis o f  liability in case, in practice the effect o f  these protection o rd e r 
provisions is to make the basis o f  liability identical to that for errors 
within jurisdiction. T h e  potential for num erous groundless suits is far 
larger in the latter case, where the protection o rd e r is o f  no assistance. 
Therefore, when the argum ent against the protection o rd e r is 
substantially the same as that for liability for im proper motive o r breach 
o f standard , and the essence o f  both is really an action upon the case, it 
seems foolish to have a special p rocedure to govern jurisdictional errors 
when the legislation itself appears to recognize the irrelevance o f  the
l0*The decision to fix upon knowing jurisdictional erro r in Sirros v. Moore, supra, footnote 7, was in 
response to the same criticisms made here, but without modification it too is unsatisfactory.
>07Supra, footnote 104.
,0*No clear governing principles appear to have emerged in this area. In Re Royal Canadian Legion 
(Branch 177) and Mount Pleasant Branch 177 Saimigs Credit Union (1964), 3 C.C.C. 381 (B.C.S.C.), the 
judge appeared to consider the merits o f the possible tort action. In Re Yoner’s Certiorari Application 
(1969) 69 W.W.R. 222 (B.C.S.C.), the judge seemed to take the view that no protection order should 
issue if there is any reasonable basis for the suit. The order was denied because it appeared the 
magistrate had been negligent. See alsoR. v. Hackam (1919), 44 O.I..R. 224 (Ont. S.C.). In R. v. Webb (1921), 
21 O.W.N. 162 (Ont. H.C.), where the magistrate was involved in attempting to enforce the civil law through 
the criminal process, the protection o rder w as denied and the magistrate's conduct was termed “outrageous" 
and ''wilful". In Okrey v. Spangler, [1925] I W.W.R. 518 (Sask. k.B.) the order was refused and the 
magistrate's conduct was termed "arbitrary” and "oppressive”.
' “•There may also be an advantage to having the public law remedy and the private law remedy 
determined at the same time, but provision could be made to have both issues heard in the ordinary 
manner by the same court.
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characterization. Instead, m ight it not be preferable to define carefully 
an action based upon breach o f standard  o r im proper motive, regardless 
o f  the classification o f the court o r the error?
Standards o f Care
In view o f the decision in Sirros v. Moore restricting trespass liability 
to knowing judicial e r ro r ,110 and in view o f the possibility o f a protection 
o rd e r issuing in many cases,111 the trespass liability o f judicial officers 
has been greatly circum scribed. Recent attention has moved somewhat 
surreptitiously towards a liability theory which focuses upon the 
standard  o f care observed, and /o r the motive o f the judicial officer. It is 
desirable, therefore, to exam ine the possibility o f imposing liability, 
irrespective o f classification o f the court o r the erro r, for the negligent, 
reckless, o r knowing erro r.
Liability for negligent judicial decision making is easily rejected as an 
inroad upon judicial im munity, if for no o ther reason than that the 
potential for liability would be so great as seriously to im pair judicial 
freedom  and recruitm ent. It would be virtually impossible to determ ine 
the issue without practically retrying the original action, and there would 
be little o r no deterrence o f the groundless suit. T h e re  would also be a 
fairly large basis o f actual liability. Judges routinely m ake decisions 
which adversely affect one party o r another, and hum an na tu re  is such 
that sooner o r later even the most com petent judge will make an e rro r 
which could be classified as negligent in the sense that term  is used in 
o ther contexts. T h e  simple breach o f the reasonable man standard  is not 
the type o f conduct which provokes m oral ou trage requ iring  an 
institutionalized legal outlet for appeasem ent, and the d e te rren t value o f 
negligence law is highly questionable.112 If com pensation for the victims 
o f judicial negligence is thought to be a worthwhile goal, it ought to be 
effected otherw ise than by negligence liability.113
In Sirros v. Moore Lord D enning suggested that an act would lose its 
judicial character, and therefo re its judicial im munity, if a ju d g e  
knowingly exceeded his jurisdiction.114 T h at was a trespass case, and the 
idea was put forward as a basis for liability in trespass, but there is no 
reason to restrict it to a trespass theory, n o r to suppose Lord D enning 
would have done so had he been faced with a pure economic loss claim.
1 t0Supra, footnote 7, at 136.
"'Supra, footnote 69.




1 0 2 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL  • REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
Lord D enning draw s no distinction between erro rs  o f  prelim inary 
and secondary jurisdiction for this purpose, and there  is no reason why 
he should. T h ere  may be a reason for distinguishing between 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional e rro rs  in trespass theory by 
considering that an act within jurisdiction, erroneous o r not, is always a 
judicial act. But this line o f  reasoning does not take us very far, because 
one can argue — and indeed the courts m ight very well so in terpret 
Lord Denning — that no judge has jurisdiction to e r r  intentionally in 
law or fact, within o r w ithout his stated powers. In principle, there is no 
reason to distinguish am ong d iffe ren t types o f intentional e rro r, and it 
would be far less com plex to remove judicial immunity for any knowing 
erro r, jurisdictional o r not.
T h e  difficulty with a cause o f action based upon knowing e rro r is 
the converse o f the difficulty with one based upon negligence: in the 
latter case the ambit o f  liability could be too wide, whereas in the 
form er, the elem ent o f knowledge might be so difficult to prove as to 
ren d er the action nugatory. T herefo re , it is necessary to seek some 
m iddle g round between the two standards.
T his suggests the possibility o f basing liability upon a standard  of 
gross negligence, o r reckless e rro r. In the U nited States it has been 
suggested that there is a distinction between acts in excess o f  jurisdiction 
and those wholly w ithout jurisdiction. Liability in the latter case seems to 
correspond to a standard  o f gross neg ligence."5 T h e  gist o f  the m atter 
seems to be that some erro rs are so gross that no reasonable person 
acting judicially could possibly have m ade them . T here is no reason why 
the same approach could not be em ployed in an action on the case, 
imposing liability w here a judge “has knowingly e rred  as to law o r fact, 
o r both, o r erred  with reckless disregard o f m aking the proper 
decision”.116
There are two difficulties with the recklessness standard . First, the 
term  has no precise m eaning, so there is a risk that it will create, as the 
negligence standard , too broad a basis o f  actual liability.117 However, 
judges, who are after all most familiar with the process, ought to be able
" 5Foi a summary and criticism see McCormack and Kirkpatrick, “Immunities o f State Officials Under 
Section l ‘»H3", (1976) 8 Rutgers (.arruien L.J. 65, at 71-73. But see Stump v. Sparkman (1978), 435 U.S. 
439. which illustrates how very difficult it is to establish liability.
"•Kates, Jr., “Immunity o f State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray 
Ret on side red", (1970) 65 Nev. U.L. Rev. 615, at 624. That author suggests that in addition the plaintiff 
be required to piove a specified improper purpose, but see “Liability o f judicial Officers U nder Section 
1983", Comment, (1970) 79 Yale L.J. 322, (1970) where the author suggests a cause o f action based 
u|>on malice, defining malice as a reckless disregard of the proper determination.
M,For example, a trial judge’s findings o f fact “. . . are not to be reversed unless it can be established 
that the learned trial judge made some palpable and overriding erro r . . ." Stein v. The Ship "Kathy K”, 
[1976] 2 S.( :.R. 802. at 808 per Rite hie |. Palpable errors are not greatly different from gross or reckless 
errors, vet f indings o f fact are overturned more frequently than desirable where this is the basis for tort 
liability.
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to em ploy the standard in such a way as to distinguish it meaningfully 
from  simple negligence. I f  necessary, liability could be fu rth er controlled 
by em ploying recklessness as an indicator o f  knowing e rro r ra ther than 
as a basis o f  liability itself. T he  greater difficulty is with the groundless 
suit which m ight be invited by the vagueness o f  the term  reckless. B y its 
very nature, an allegation o f reckless e rro r cannot easily be struck down 
at the pleading stage, and it may not, therefore, provide a sufficient 
d e terren t to potential suits. O ne possible solution would be to discourage 
suits th rough  procedural provisions, perhaps by insisting upon the 
p lain tiffs posting security for costs,118 and perhaps by im posing cost 
penalties upon the unsuccessful plaintiff. T h e  breadth  o f liability can 
also be contracted by insisting, in addition, upon p roof o f im proper 
judicial motive, but that approach also has its disadvantages.
Improper Motive
As an alternative to focusing upon the standard  o f care per se, a 
cause o f action which focuses upon im proper judicial motive should be 
considered. Judges are given enorm ous power, and it seems entirely 
appropria te  to sanction them  when they abuse it. In a cause o f action 
based upon im proper motive alone, the standard o f care observed would 
be strictly speaking irrelevant, but it would still be necessary to prove a 
judicial e rro r to satisfy the causation elem ent o f the suit. Im proper 
motive without dem onstrable e rro r is m ore appropriately dealt with by 
removal from  office and /o r public law sanctions.
Im proper motive has been discussed primarily as the question of 
liability for malicious erro r. It seems clear that the com m on law granted 
absolute im munity for malicious acts within the jurisdiction o f any judge 
o f a superior court, and probably this immunity extended to any judge 
acting as a court o f reco rd .119 E rrors o f jurisdiction were actionable 
w ithout p roof o f malice prior to Sirros v. M oore. 120 Malice is also an 
essential elem ent in some o f the statutory provisions governing the 
liability o f o ther judges.121
U nfortunately, malice is a term  which rivals jurisdiction for 
definitional uncertainty, and despite frequent reference to the term  in
11 *The Public Authorities Protection Act. R.S.O. 1970. c. 374. s. 14. See also the sophisticated cost provisions 
employed in France, summarized in J. F .Johnson, (1971) 4 Ottawa L.R 627. at 630-1.
u *Supra, footnote 6, at 520-30.
l,0Lord Denning expressly indicates a desire to immunize both simple errors of jurisdiction and 
malicious conduct, for all judges, supra, footnote 7, at 126. However, there is a dose relationship 
between the knowing juditial error and malice which he does not consider.
"'Supra, at 88-91.
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the context o f judicial im munity, no clear m eaning has em erged .122 
Malice does m ean som ething m ore than m ere spite o r ill will as the term  
is often used in common English. In a general sense, at law malice is a 
term  used to denote some im proper motive, and this in tu rn  suggests 
two possible approaches. T h e  first is to define certain specific motives as 
im proper, and to make judicial erro rs  so m otivated actionable in to rt.123 
For exam ple, any judicial e rro r motivated by a desire to secure a private 
advantage, such as a bribe, m ight be classified as im proper and 
actionable in tort. If  this approach is p referred , the term  malice can be 
avoided altogether and replaced by a list o f  specified objectionable 
conduct. Alternatively, malice has been defined m ore generally by Mr. 
Justice Rand as “. . . acting for a reason and purpose knowingly foreign 
to the adm inistration . . .”124 o f the judicial function. This definition 
corresponds almost exactly to Lord D enning’s concept o f  knowing 
jurisdictional e rro r in Sirros v. Moore, yet Lord Denning expressly 
affirm ed the desirability o f  m aintaining judicial im m unity for malice.125 
O ne can only speculate that he was re ferring  to malice in some o ther 
sense, such as, perhaps, ill will o r bias towards the party .126 A lthough it 
is possible to make value choices about degrees o f im propriety, 
sanctioning some and not o th ers ,127 it seems preferable that all knowing 
errors, or malicious acts, as defined by Rand J . ,128 be treated  alike. In 
that case, the basis o f  the action m ight with less confusion be called 
misfeasance o f public office ra ther than malice.129
IM()ne author has suggested that the judicial definitions of the term fall into four distinct categories. 
(¡.H I.. Fridman. “Malice In the l.aw of Torts", (1958) 21 Modem L. Rev. 484.
' “ Kates, Jr., supra, footnote 116, at 624; Comment, supra, footnote 116, at 322, fn. 3; Fridman, supra, 
footnote 122; Fleming, The Imw of Torts, (5th ed), at 608-610.
>l*Ronearelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121, at 141.
ltiSupra, at 80 and 84.
I,6II one adopts Mr. Justice Rand's definition o f malice, supra, footnote 124, the term is exactly 
equivalent to Lord Denning’s notion of knowing error, except that the form er may not be restricted to 
jurisdictional errors. In either event, the plaintiffs motive is irrelevant. See infra, footnote 127. With 
other definitions o f malice, improper motive is the very essence o f the definition. See supra, footnote
122. In that c ase, the error, be it knowing, negligent, or innocent, is not an element o f the definition of
malice, although prool o f a certain type of error in addition to proof o f malice may be required to
substantiate a cause o f  action. See, for example, the statutory provisions, cited supra, footnote 55. Malice
as defined infra, footnote ISO is probably being employed as a conclusive indicator o f either o f the 
definitional approaches discussed above.
’’’For example, it was admitted in Roncarellt v. Duplessts, supra, footnote 124, that in effectively 
cancelling Ronearelli's liquor license, the Premier of Quebec was moved to slop the circulation of 
documents which he felt were detrimental to the public interest. I his is arguably less objectionable 
conduct than acts motivated by, for example, the prospect o f private gain. The Supreme Court of 
Canada drew no such distinction and imposed liability.
llM.Supra, footnote 123.
'**See Farrington v. Thomson and Brid gland, [1959] V.R. 286, at 293 (S.C.), where the judge discusses a
nominate tort called “misefeasance in a public office", considers various definitions o f malice, and 
defines this tort exactly as Rand J. defined malice, supra, footnote 124.
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However one defines malice, the question next comes, how is the 
plaintiff to prove it. Malice m ight be conclusively proven by 
dem onstrating  a reckless e r ro r ,130 in which case the term  adds nothing 
to the recklessness test and may be avoided altogether. At the o ther 
extrem e, the plaintiff m ight be required  to pi;ove malice independently 
o f the e rro r itself;131 whereas an interm ediate position would perm it, but 
not compel, the draw ing o f  an inference o f malice from  the grossness o f 
the e r ro r .132
If  the latter approach were adopted, then it is questionable w hether 
anything would be gained by phrasing the action in term s o f malice 
ra th er than simply in term s o f  recklessness, em ployed either as the 
standard  itself o r as an indicator o f knowing erro r. T he  case for 
im m unizing malicious judicial acts rests largely upon the particularly 
unsavoury natu re  o f  the allegation, which, however groundless, is likely 
to ignore the policies which support judicial im m unity .'In  addition to 
being a m ore straightforw ard basis o f  liability, the recklessness standard  
alone makes an accusation o f malice technically unnecessary.133 Since not 
all reckless erro rs will necessarily support an inference o f im proper 
motive, the advantage to approaching the issue from  the direction o f 
malice is that fewer suits will actually succeed. But actual cases o f  either 
reckless e rro r or malice are likely to be very rare, and there would seem 
to be no advantage to one approach over the o ther as to the m ore 
realistic concern with groundless suits. For those reasons, the less 
offensive recklessness standard  is preferable.
If, on the o ther hand, the basis o f the action is the independent 
p roof o f im proper purpose, the argum ents are somewhat different. 
Such conduct, independently  proven, is sufficiently reprehensible that it 
may well outweigh the argum ents in support o f  im m unity.134 T he 
requirem ent o f independent p roo f o f the specific malicious intent may 
also help to limit the num ber o f groundless suits com m enced, o r at the 
very least m ake it easier to strike down the action at an early stage. But 
the disadvantage is that this is such an onerous burden  on the plaintiff 
that those wronged by gross e rro rs which would support an inference o f 
malice may fail to establish liability.135
'••Sometimes malice is simply defined in terms o f a reckless erro r without further reference to motive. 
See New York Times v. Sullivan. (1964) 376 U.S. 254, at 280; Comment, supra, footnote 116. This use of 
the term malice adds little, whether it means recklessness as a breach o f standard per se, or as conclusive 
indicator of some improper motive.
,slT here is obiter dicta in Hamilton v. Anderson (1858), XX Session Cases 16 (H.L. Scot.) suggesting that
independent proof is required.
,s ,In the similar action for malicious prosecution where want o f reasonable and probable cause and 
malice must be proven, malice may be inferred. See Mitchell v. Jenkms (1833), 110 F.R. 908; Fleming, 
supra, footnote 123; Carpenter v. MacDonald (1978), 91 D.L.R. (3d) 743 (l)ist. Ct.). The authority of 
Mitchell v. Jenkms was relied upon in Crawford v. Beattie (1876), 39 D.C.Q.B. 13, at 33 in an action 
against a magistrate.
m ln practice one would expec t a plaintiff to offer independent evidence o f malice were it available.
134H arper 8c James. The Law of Torts (1956), at 1645.
,3iSee Kates, Jr., supra, footnote 116.
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Im proper motive may also be com bined with the breach o f  the 
relevant standard  as the basis for a cause o f  action. As such, malice can 
be used to limit liability based upon reckless o r negligent conduct. 
However, the basic difficulties rem ain. It has, for exam ple, been 
suggested in the United States that a cause o f  action based upon 
knowing or reckless e rro r, and express malice, would be ap p ro p ria te .136 
But, as already suggested, independent p roo f o f knowing e rro r or 
express malice ought to be sufficient g round for liability, although 
perhaps not a necessary basis in view o f  the onerous burden  it would 
place upon the plaintiff. T he  recklessness standard  alone may provide 
an invitation to groundless suits, but if malice is to be inferred  from  the 
reckless e rro r itself, then there would seem to be no advantage to 
incorporating the term  into the definition o f  the case o f action. A cause 
o f action based upon the negligence standard  plus malice has the same 
disadvantages: independent p roof o f  malice is very difficult, and if the 
inference o f malice is to be draw n largely from  the e rro r itself, it will be 
necessary to focus upon the reckless e rro r in practice.137
T h erefo re , the only advantage to founding judicial liability 
exclusively upon im proper judicial motive is that the insistence upon 
independent p ro o f o f malice may curtail groundless suits, but in so 
doing it may also ren d er the cause o f action im potent. By requiring 
malice, but perm itting the inference to be drawn from  the e rro r itself, 
the recklessness standard  may be better distinguished from a simple 
negligence standard , but the practical effect upon the judicial definition 
o f the recklessness standard is questionable. O n the whole, the simple 
recklessness standard  which renders an inquiry into unsavoury judicial 
motives strictly unnecessary will probably serve equally well.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
I here is a strong public interest in having a highly respected 
judicial system, staffed by com petent persons, free to exercise their 
judicial functions without fear o f private liability. T his public interest is 
best protected by devising a rule o f judicial im munity which both limits 
the to rt liability o f  judicial officers and also controls the num ber o f 
groundless suits which may be instituted. It is, however, symbolically 
undesirable to confer absolute im m unity upon a social group, and 
especially undesirable for that g roup  to confer absolute im m unity upon 
itself. M oreover, in cases o f  gross judicial m isconduct, the general
1 '®S upra, footnote 116.
'" T h e  staluton provisions which recognize want o f reasonable and probable cause plus malice as 
necessary elements o f the cause o f action are subject to the same observations. Although want of 
reasonable and probable cause has a subjective, as well as an objective element (see Fleming, supra, 
footnote 123, ai 603-606) provided malice may be inferred from the error, the plaintiff either has the 
option o f proving bad faith independently, or taking the more likely route o f relying upon a 
rec klessness standard.
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rationales o f tort liability may be m ore im portant than the rationales 
which support judicial immunity. T he  problem  is then to define a 
limiting form ula which best strikes the balance between these several 
objections.
T he  distinction between superior and inferior courts rests upon the 
mildly offensive notion that superior court judges are the absolute 
arbitrators o f  their own jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, in tu rn , is significant 
only to the action in trespass, which in itself has m any shortcomings.
I he distinction between courts of, and not of, record does distinguish 
between judges somewhat on the basis o f the powers which they 
exercise, but not sufficiently to justify d ifferent liability rules.
T h e  essence o f the trespass action is in terference with the person o r 
property; ordinarily one is prima facie  liable for such in terference and 
m ust establish an affirm ative defence. Liability is strict in the sense that 
it m atters not w hether the e rro r was com m itted with the utm ost care 
and good faith. W hen one considers the num erous prima facie  trespasses 
which a judge is required  to com m it in the course o f his duties, and the 
num erous difficult jurisdictional questions which he must face, there is 
m uch to recom m end absolute immunity for trespass. But this reasoning 
does not necessarily preclude liability in an action on the case, w here the 
action requires p roof o f a certain  intention o r want o f care on the 
judge’s part. Damage m ust occur and be assessed in this type o f action, 
but beyond that the judge’s conduct, and not its result, is the basis o f the 
action.
D eferring for a m om ent the question o f what intention o r want o f  
care ought to attract liability, the general advantages o f  the action on the 
case over trespass should be noted. O ne can im agine cases o f gross 
m isconduct where the balance between the reasons for judicial im munity 
and the traditional goals o f  tort law might shift in favour o f the latter. 
An action which focuses upon the judge’s conduct, carefully defined, can 
respond to these points while at the same time preserving absolute 
im munity for honest e r ro r  which might otherw ise be sanctioned in 
trespass un d er some o f the form ulations o f the immunity rule discussed 
earlier. T his approach also renders the nebulous distinctions between 
various types o f equally harm ful e rro r unnecessary. A lthough an action 
based upon some standard  o f judicial conduct would provide a m uch 
narrow er basis o f liability, it would support a b roader range o f damages. 
T h e  action in trespass is responsive to interferences with the person and 
property  o f the plaintiff, but not to his purely economic losses. If, for 
exam ple, the basis o f the action were gross judicial m isconduct, then 
there is no reason in logic o r com m on sense why the plain tiff should not 
recover his business losses and legal expenses so caused. T h ere  is am ple 
judicial support for the proposition that an otherw ise tortious act does
108 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
not lose its tortious character simply because the loss is purely 
econom ic.138
Strictly speaking, the action on the case has been thus far confined 
to actions against judges acting as inferior courts, o r m ore probably 
courts not o f record, for e rro rs  com m itted within their jurisdiction. But 
the actual basis o f liability proposed in Sirros v. Moore, and the effect o f 
statutory protection o rders granted by reviewing courts, reflects a trend 
towards the action on the case in practice.139 T h e  choice is between 
focusing upon breach o f a defined standard  o f care, and upon im proper 
judicial motive. Independent p ro o f o f im proper judicial motive is such 
an onerous obligation that the action will be virtually useless, and the 
same can be said o f  the similar requirem ent o f independent p roof o f 
knowing erro r. T hese might be adopted as sufficient bases o f  liability, 
but should not be the sole o r necessary criteria. T h e  negligence standard 
creates too broad an ambit o f liability, so a recklessness standard  is the 
appropriate  m iddle g round. T h ere  is some concern that such a standard 
will not sufficiently discourage the vexatious suit, but perhaps that 
problem  has been overra ted ,140 and in any event perhaps it ought to be 
accepted as a lesser evil than virtually absolute judicial immunity. If 
necessary, the vexatious suit may be controlled with provisions for cost 
security and /o r penalty. A lthough it is always difficult to balance 
perfectly a num ber o f  com peting interests, the recklessness standard  
seems superior to the o ther options as the appropria te  basis o f judicial 
liability.
A NOTE ON COMPENSATION WITHOUT LIABILITY
T h u s far this analysis has concentrated almost exclusively upon the 
public’s interest in judicial im munity, and ignored almost entirely the 
private interest in com pensation. Once one accepts a certain degree o f 
judicial immunity, the question next comes, w hether it is possible and 
desirable to devise a governm ent-funded scheme to com pensate for at 
least some of the losses which will not support a liability suit against the 
judge who caused them .
, s r l he clearest statement to this effect is that o f Salmon L.J. in Ministry o] Housing and Local Government 
v. Sharp, [1970] 2 (J.B 223, 278 (C.A.), approved in Rivtow Marine iJd. v. Washington Iron Works (1973), 
40 D.L.R (3d) 530. at 547 (S.C.C.).
, , r I'he same trend has been observed in the courts' approach to the liability o f other public authorities. 
See M. (i. Bridge, "(iovernment Liability, the T ort of Negligence and the House o f lx>rds decision in 
Anns v. Merton London Borough Council", (1978) 24 McGill L.J. 277, at 287.
“ “Perhaps society could place the same confidence in the judiciary that Ix>rd Reid placed in the public 
servants o f England. See Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., [1970] A.C. 1004, at 1033 (H.L.). See also de 
Smith, supra, footnote 103, at 97; \1. Bra/ier. supra, footnote 5.
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If  com pensation is the only goal, the scheme should be indifferent 
to w hether the judicial e r ro r was factual, legal, jurisdictional o r 
substantial; and ind ifferen t to w hether it was caused intentionally, 
negligently, o r innocently — the party’s loss may be the same in any 
event. W hether or not a person “should” be com pensated for any loss 
incurred  in any o f these circum stances is a value choice, but it is 
obviously unrealistic to provide com pensation for every loss in a society 
where universal m edicare exists only precariously, and w here most 
non-tortiously caused personal injuries are not com pensated by the 
public purse. It is simply a question o f social priorities, and  the m ore 
realistic question is w hether society ought to devise some m ore limited 
com pensation scheme.
The first alternative is a fault-based com pensation scheme, such as, 
for exam ple, one which com pensated victims o f negligent judicial error. 
T h ere  are both costs and benefits associated with determ ining fault. T he  
aggrieved party might find solace and appeasem ent, and, in a 
roundabout way, the principle that no man is by virtue o f  his office 
above the ord inary  law o f the land would be symbolically affirm ed. Such 
a scheme m ight also have a d e te rren t effect by singling out a particularly 
inefficient judge. It is, however, debatable w hether such benefits are 
sufficient to justify com pensating some, and  not o thers, for precisely the 
same loss.
M oreover, a fault-based com pensation scheme for judicial e rro r may 
be prejudicial to the public interest which supports judicial immunity. 
A lthough a judge would not be personally liable, his conduct and his 
reputation would nonetheless be at issue. Presumably, he would be 
called upon — formally o r informally — to justify his conduct before the 
tribunal which determ ined fault. T h ere  would be little disincentive to a 
person m aking a claim for com pensation, many cases would be 
re-litigated, and the efficiency o f  the judicial process would commonly 
be questioned in an institutionalized forum . Finally, the notion o f  a 
tribunal, probably em ployed by the governm ent, adjudicating upon 
judicial fault, is offensive to the notion o f an independent judicial 
system.
Given the problem s o f a fault-based plan and the expense o f a 
com prehensive no-fault fram ew ork, the reasonable com prom ise is to 
consider a no-fault scheme designed to com pensate only particularly 
serious losses. T h e  erroneously caused incarceration o f a party for a 
substantial time is a type o f dam age which can be distinguished from 
technical batteries and false im prisonm ents, property  dam age, and pure 
economic loss. It is, o f  course, a m atter o f political choice and financial 
priorities w hether the scheme ought to go fu rther, but it seems 
unrealistic to set h igher goals in the foreseeable fu ture. Several 
jurisdictions have com pensation schemes for this type o f injury, and 
even they set m onetary limits far below what a court would probably
calculate as adequate com pensation.141 T h e  general issue is deserving o f 
far m ore detailed consideration than is possible here, but it seems 
certain that only limited steps towards com pensating victims o f judicial 
e r ro r may be expected at the present.
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141 For examples o f U.S. statutory provisions authorizing payments to persons wrongly convicted see: The 
California Penal Code, Part 3, Title 6, Chapter 5, s. 4904 (West 1970); The Court of Claims Act III. Ann. 
Stat. c. 37 s. 439.8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); The Judicial Code and Judiciary 28 U.S.C.A. s. 2513(e) (West 
1965).
